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INTRODUCTION 
“Making money is not the goal of the Frenchman— it’s not recognized as giving you 
respect or happiness.  Many French companies do not expand because the owner sees the 
stress involved in enlarging it as destroying his own happiness in life— he’d rather limit 
his business success.  For an American executive, to be successful is 98% of his goal in 
life.  For a French executive, it is 65 percent.  That extra 35 percent is for being himself, 
looking for mushrooms, for instance, in his little forest.” 
-Ernest-Antoine Sellière 
Chairman and CEO of the French holding company CGIP. 
  
 When I first visited France, I was consumed by a laid-back culture, full of people 
who appeared to devote large amounts of their time to relaxing.  It seemed that during all 
times of the day, there were always people out sitting for hours at a local café or park, 
chatting with friends, reading, or simply watching the day—and people—go by.  In 
America, people are always rushing somewhere, keeping up with the fast-paced lifestyle, 
and relaxing only if and when all duties at work are completed.  The American, work-
obsessed culture has its pros though, and I have always been accustomed to instantly 
receiving service from businesses during most hours of the day.  Once I arrived in 
France, I realized that everything suddenly took longer.  I no longer had the option of 
taking a quick trip to the bank during my lunch break, or running my errands on the 
weekends.  Between 12 and 2 PM, offices closed; the French worshiped their two, or 
sometimes three, hour lunch break, and if I ever happened to want lunch after 2 PM, there 
was little hope because most restaurants were closed.  There were always people out and 
about, but it seemed as if businesses were rarely opened when I needed them to be.  
Sundays were exceptionally inoperative.  There was no chance of the French selling me 
anything as the entire city was shut down.  Sundays were spent with family and friends 
either at home or in the numerous well-kept parks.    
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 Although in France, I might have missed the instant gratification that American 
businesses warranted me, now that I am back in America, I miss even more the relaxed 
atmosphere that enveloped French society.  It did not take long for me to adjust to the 
unconventional hours, and I began to understand and appreciate the French way of life.  I 
miss watching people of all ages enjoying what appeared to be a carefree daily life.  I 
greatly admired the glorified life away from work in France, an idea that I never even 
seemed to notice in America.  My personal experiences in France led me to wonder how 
a culture such as this survived.  It was apparent that the French were working less than 
Americans.  Throughout history, France has also upheld a strong, competitive 
economy—even if not as great as the United States.  Most drastically, I perceived the 
overall quality of life, especially for workers, to be far more pleasant than in the United 
States.  This observance provoked my thesis research, and I wanted to learn more about 
the effects of hour reductions on the economy and societal welfare—specifically the 35-
hour workweek in France.      
 According to the OECD Better life index of 2014, People in the United States 
work 1,790 hours a year and spend 60% of their day not working, or devoting their time 
to personal care and leisure, while People in France work 1,479 hours a year and spend 
64% of their day on average not working.  French employees are working less due to 
programs such as the 35-hour work week and 5 weeks of paid vacation, and it is clear that 
the French are spending fewer hours working than Americans.  Two questions arise from 
these statistics. Does this extra free time give the French more opportunities to partake in 
activities that could ultimately lead to increased happiness?  Also, how does this policy 
ultimately affect the economy?  The latter question might be more important to many, 
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especially in the highly capitalistic and globalized society that we live in today; but I also 
hope to find out which question the French believe is the most important.  Do French 
employees need an immense, growing economy with plentiful and quality jobs to be 
happy?  Or does the quantity and quality of hours spent away from work better expand 
the happiness of French employees?  In my thesis, I hope to answer these questions. 
 As French President Charles de Gaulle once said, “Life should not be dominated 
by work, if you work too hard, you will become crazy!”  After my time abroad, I realized 
that many Americans simply live to work.  I believe that the French, on the other hand, 
work to live.  Many times this positive notion is overshadowed by cultural stereotypes.  
France has long had the reputation of taking a lax approach to working life. Two-hour 
lunch breaks, five weeks of paid-vacation, and a 35-hour workweek only nurture the lazy 
stereotype of the French by the typical American.  Recently, the media blasted the idea of 
increased French laziness, as false reports regarding work emails were released.  “No 
after-work e-mails please. French ordered to ignore the boss after 6 pm” ran the title of 
one report.1  In reality, there was no new piece of French regulation, but a labor 
agreement within the high-tech and consulting field that affected an estimated 250,000 
employees.2  False, overestimated reports such as these only strengthen the negative 
stereotypes that often define French workers.  In my thesis, I hope to prove that the 
French are hard workers, but simply value life away from work more, focusing on the 
things in life that bring them real happiness.  I believe the average work-consumed 
American should take note of this French peculiarity.    
                                                
1 The Report was run by The Times, a British daily national newspaper. 
2 The agreement referred to an “obligation to disconnect communications tools, but only after an 
employee has worked a 13-hour day” (“France’s 6pm e-mail ban: Not what it seemed”). 
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 As Anders Hayden explains, “The 35-hour workweek in France is one of the 
boldest, and arguably most complex, social reforms of recent times in any advanced 
capitalist nation” (504).  In comparison to other countries, the length of the workweek 
has taken a central place in many labor relations.  Since the early days of the Industrial 
Revolution, numerous efforts have been made by governments to enact protective 
regulations limiting employees’ hours of work.  In the nineteenth century— thanks to 
labor unrest and union agitation that drove political campaigns— the British “Factory 
Acts” and American labor laws were passed to restrict the maximum number of hours of 
work per day or per week, ostensibly to protect workers’ health and safety (Dembe 459).  
Similarly, many countries across the world celebrate Labor Day on May 1, the starting 
date of a strike in 1886 Chicago in favor of an 8-hour working day, when several workers 
were killed and wounded (Estevão and Sá, “The 35-hour workweek” 419).  Workweek 
reductions have been the norm for years now, and workers in many countries have fought 
for this well-deserved right to benefit their quality of lives. 
 Critics might believe that the 35-hour workweek in France is drastic and a 
hindrance to businesses in a highly competitive and globalized world, but I have higher 
hopes for this policy in increasing workers’ quality of life and supporting the idea of the 
French exception: working to live.  With my research on the 35-hour workweek in 
France, I hope to learn more about the culture and history of French workers and the 
ensuing labor movements; the involvement of workers and politics in enacting specific 
details of policy; the effects of the policy on the French economy, and specifically 
employment; and the effects of the policy on the overall quality of life of workers in 
France.  If I am correct with my predictions, I hope to discover that the 35-hour 
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workweek is simply part of a French culture that focuses more specifically on life, and 
not of work; the policy is still around today because of the great support of French 
workers who are determined to receive the utmost working conditions; and without 
regard to the economic effects, the policy is a success because of the great increase of 
quality of life in France.  
 In my first chapter, I will discuss the history of the French labor movement, 
starting from the Early Modern Era.  Although this very early history is lengthy and does 
not directly relate to the 35-hour workweek, it is imperative in tracing the roots of social 
inequality in France.  This inequality led to the French Revolution, which overturned the 
exclusive French monarchy and granted equality for all under the new constitution, and 
served as a critical moment by fortifying labor movements that, in turn, have shaped the 
modern working culture.  Chapter 1 will not only explore the French inequalities across 
workers, but also the major displays of opposition to this inequality through strikes, and 
the labor unions that ultimately resulted.  I will introduce the major labor unions in 
France, specifically explaining their history, demography, density, and popularity.  I will 
search for correlations in both past and present labor movements and use the results to 
make a general conclusion about the culture of labor unions, and essentially, work in 
France.  By understanding the history and culture of work in France, we will become 
familiar with the average French worker, and then, can better comprehend how and why 
the 35-hour workweek was enacted.  
 The purpose of my second chapter is to provide detailed information regarding the 
35-hour workweek in France.  In the chapter, I will explain the policy’s specific 
implications, and this will serve as a foundation for analysis in the following chapters.  In 
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addition, I will discuss the rational for a reduced workweek and the political ideology that 
molded it.  I will try to gauge the importance of politics by discussing the transformation 
of the law through amendments as different political parties took power.  I will also 
research the influence of labor unions, highlighting their opinions and involvement 
specific to the 35-hour workweek.  By understanding the role of politics and labor unions, 
specific supporters and opponents of the policy can be identified, and this will help 
explain greater conclusions of whom the policy benefited.  At the end of the chapter, I 
hope to determine the extent of workweek reductions, discovering how many hours the 
French actually work, and how drastic the change was compared to previous years.  At 
this point in my thesis, I hope that readers will understand the 35-hour workweek as a 
labor policy, who endorses it, and how it works. 
 Chapter 3 analyses the effects of the 35-hour workweek on the French economy, 
and more specifically employment.  I will begin the chapter by explaining the rationale 
for an economic boost, and then dissect the specific effects on employment.  By 
examining previous research and studying general economic statistics, I will make an 
initial conclusion of the effects on employment.  Then, I analyze the effects of specific 
phases of the policy, highlighting the most relevant key dates that transformed the 
original policy.  I run regressions to analyze the effects of these phases on the 
unemployment rate and average annual hours worked.  The regressions will allow me to 
form a more accurate conclusion of the effects of the 35-hour workweek on employment, 
while pinpointing the specific phases of the policy that may have hindered the policy’s 
overall success.   
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 Chapter 4 will discuss the overall effects of the 35-hour workweek on workers’ 
quality of life.  Similar to Chapter 3, I will begin by discussing the rationale for increased 
worker well-being due to the 35-hour workweek.  I will then explain the initial opinions 
of French workers, and predict who would benefit most from a reduction in hours.  I will 
highlight the allocation of free time, and consequently, how it was used.  I not only hope 
to draw overall conclusions on the welfare of the greater French population, but also 
target exactly who was affected the greatest.  After determining who gains and who loses 
and the extent of these effects, I hope to make an overall conclusion, determining if the 
35-hour workweek was successful in increasing the quality of life for French workers. 
 In Chapter 5, I introduce additional labor policies that influence working life in 
France.  I provide a broad view of working life in France, pointing out those who benefit 
the most and those who sometimes miss out on the full security that the policies are 
intended to provide.  I then compare France to the United States, Sweden, and Germany.  
I use the United States as a contrast to France, highlighting the key differences and the 
effects they have on the labor force.  Sweden and Germany provide alternate views of 
labor policy in Europe although relatively similar to France.  The comparison explains 
the main goals that each country’s labor policies strive to achieve, and how they affect 
the greater population. I plan to use this comparison as a way of discovering if specific 
countries policies are better in fighting unemployment and increasing worker welfare 
than the 35-hour workweek, and use this information to suggest better policy options for 
France.  In conclusion, I hope to give readers an idea of working life in France by 
studying the 35-hour workweek.  Understanding the policy and its effects on employment 
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and quality of life will help me form a greater conclusion about the overall success of the 
35-hour workweek, and its connection to the greater culture of working-life in France.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  10 
CHAPTER 1: A Brief History of Work in France 
“French people are strongly polychromic and not obsessed by time. As far as punctuality 
at meetings is concerned, this is an emotional thing.  There is a mental/psychological 
resistance to the ‘military’ aspect of companies, the hierarchy and so on.  French people 
are individualists, they want to have a sense of independence, a margin of freedom, and 
not to be part of a mold.  They have fun playing with and by-passing rules (and laws…).” 
Jean-Claude Guez 
   French Executive; Andersen Consulting 
 
 Throughout history, literature, art, and film have often portrayed the French as an 
aloof people in an extremely romanticized culture.  Polly Platt reminds us of this in her 
book French or Foe? She claims that “Everyone knows it’s the land of the 4 F’s—Food, 
Fashion, Fragrance and Frivolity” (16).  This viewpoint frequently takes the forefront in 
foreign perceptions, but the culture of French workers actually presents an alternate idea.  
Work and labor movements throughout history reveal a people with a passion for fairness 
and equality, and the French have continuously proved to be hard-working, especially 
when demanding better working conditions. In more modern times, this determination 
can be related to the 35-hour workweek.  During years of slow economic growth and 
sluggish union activity, France worked together to create a policy to boost the economy 
and increase worker well-being.  In 1998, the 35-hour workweek in France was enacted 
by the government with the cooperation and demands of labor unions.  By examining the 
inequality of social classes at work in early years of France that led to movements 
through revolution and strike, and labor unions, we are better able to understand the effort 
that is executed by workers to achieve their demands for better working conditions and 
policies.  Ultimately, this history will allow us to understand the exceptional involvement 
of workers in French labor policy, and more specifically, within the 35-hour workweek. 
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Dark Times for French Workers: Inequality and Revolt 
 Both the significance of work and the inequality that frequently emerged can first 
be traced to The Early Modern Era and especially, through that of the peasants in a feudal 
society. During the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries, family members worked 
hard to survive. Each village developed a social rank that revolved around those who 
were most powerful, commonly the literate communal officials.  Often times, the poorest 
members of the community had no political voice, and the higher officials manipulated 
the political system to their advantage, charging high taxes to rural peasants who did not 
own land, but persistently worked the land (Farr 29).  During this time, it can be 
estimated that the church, crown, and lord took about two-thirds of what the peasants 
produced (Farr 38). The feudal and hierarchal systems in France provided no alternative 
for those in poverty to actually succeed.  This intense poverty that put unfair pressure on 
the lower working classes caused significant unrest and was bound for resistance and 
revolution. 
 Resulting from the history of inequality within the working class, in March of 
1789, peasant unrest finally broke out during the French Revolution.  “The Revolution 
swept away a corrupt society based on privilege, despotism, and superstition and replaced 
it with a society based on the invariant laws of nature and the crystal line simplicity of 
reason, in which equality under the law and the liberty of the individual citizen would be 
at once the foundation and the goal of public life” (Sewell 62).  The Revolution presented 
more equality and increased power to the lower classes while also introducing a new 
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constitution.  This constitution would be the turning point for French political institutions 
that would ultimately create a more economically sound and liberal nation.  
 The French Revolution and the National Constituent Assembly entirely changed 
French laws. The new constitution completely abolished the feudal system and all of the 
obligations and dues that it entailed, removing the tax exemptions of the nobility and the 
clergy (Acemoglu and Robinson 284). It also deemed equality for all, making all citizens, 
without distinction of birth, eligible to any office or dignity, whether ecclesiastical, civil, 
or military (Acemoglu and Robinson 285).  This radical change in French law prepared 
France for institutions that would allow for greater economic success.  The abolition of 
the feudal system and creation of fair, equal taxes created greater incentives for the 
French to work and produce more.  Equality for all allowed citizens the chance to rise in 
society, contributing to innovation and technology for the nation, and holding the wealth 
that each deserved.  The new constitution created the perfect equation for a nation that 
could succeed economically, while also boosting the well-being of the lower classes who 
had struggled for so long.  The determined people in France, who led the revolution and 
helped create economic success for the nation, are the same determined people of the 
workforce in France that can be seen in modern times.  Through union involvement and 
massive demonstrations, the French continue to fight for workers’ rights and policies that 
would be most beneficial to them. 
 The rise of unions can be anticipated from the early history and culture of 
inequality and labor relations between the government and workers.  Roots can be traced 
back to the Early Modern Era, when the first law on the subject, the Loi Le Chapelier of 
1791, suppressed combinations founded on alleged common industrial or trade interest by 
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forbidding combinations of workers (Meyers 47).  After many years, France began to 
enact minute rules of law governing labor-management relations, slowly recognizing 
intergroup arrangements as quasi-public in character, so that employers and unions could 
develop rules within legal boundaries, which might become a charter for an entire 
industry, or in some cases for the entire economy, binding upon other employers and 
workers not parties to the agreement (Meyers 48).  This perspective is unique to France, 
embracing pluralism and helping to defend the complexity and validity of unions.  
 The mid-1800s gave birth to collective bargaining as a significant and seemingly 
lasting institution with pervasive influence on the French economy and on French 
industrial relations practice (Meyers 48).  Although strikes were frequent many years 
prior, le droit de coalition in 1864 legalized strikes, on the condition that they were 
peaceful and respectable (Labrune, Toutain, and Zwang 88).  Years later, in 1884, the 
legal right to exist was endowed to unions, as permanent institutions (Meyers 48).  After 
unions were officially allowed to exist, the right to strike was utilized to achieve change 
after beliefs of injustice in a more acceptable way.  As collective bargaining became 
more popular, unions created a series of elected committees through the Conseils de 
Prud’hommes, or labor courts, ultimately deciding the fate of grievances and disputes, 
within and without unions (Meyers 49). The labor policy surrounding collective 
bargaining created a system in which workers could effectively voice their complaints 
and witness action, and unions could become more credible, therefore strengthening their 
role in political and economic discussions nationwide. 
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The Modern Unions of France 
 France has five confédérations, or trade union centers composed of affiliated 
unions, which are recognized by the state as negotiating partners (Meyers 53). The largest 
and oldest, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) was founded in 1895 by labor 
organizers and many anarchists who upheld the doctrine of revolutionary syndicalism, 
which aimed to eliminate the state and bring the working class to a social revolution 
through unionism (Haus 110).  The CGT was known for intense hostility toward 
employers and the organization of capitalist production during certain periods (Chapman, 
Kesselman, and Schain 5).  After World War II, this confédération was dominated by the 
Communist party until the 1990s (Haus 132).  Frustrated with the domination of the 
French Communist party over the CGT, several members left to create the anti-
Communist Force Ouvrière (FO) in 1948, and eventually this confédération was funded 
by both the French government and the American Federation of Labor (Lorwin 530-533).  
In 1945, a few years before the FO was founded, the Confédération française de 
l’encadrement- Confédération générale des cadres (CFE-CGC) was created by white-
collar cadres, or supervisors and professional employees such as engineers and 
administrative staff (Reynaud 215).   
 Not only are there secular unions for both blue and white collar workers in 
France, but also two prominent confédérations that were historically very religious.  The 
Confédération Française des Travaileurs Chrétiens (CFTC), founded in 1919, had strong 
links with the social Christian party and has ultimately remained a powerful 
confédération with a fairly constant membership rate (Lorwin 533).  After World War II, 
a majority fraction broke away from the CFTC to form the Confédération Française 
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Démocratique du Travail (CFDT), which emerged in 1964 and changed to a more 
moderate reorientation after a radical and militant period (Haus 132).  The CFDT 
continued to drop all references in its statutes and program to the Catholic church and 
officially embrace socialism in 1970 (Reynaud 208).  The history of the major 
confédérations in France portrays controversy and hostility within parties, which 
ultimately led to the creation of new unions, but it can also be proven that the 
confédérations joined together when beneficial, most notably in the form of strikes. 
 In 1966, the CFDT and the CGT struck a unity of action pact that committed both 
unions to joint support for workers’ strikes at the local level.  Chapman, Kesselman, and 
Schain argue that “these breakthroughs for labor— greater unity in the movement, greater 
combativeness in the workplace— prepared the ground for that stunning surprise, May 
1968, when 7 million workers took part in the largest strike wave in the country’s history 
and helped unions rise to a position of central importance in French political and 
economic life” (11).  The strikes are often referred to as a “social revolution” with the 
great desire to do away with Gaullist capitalism, which was seen as an authoritarian 
system (Ball 79). There were thousands of public conversations taking place not about 
who should be elected to office or how to get a raise in pay, but about how work, society, 
and life itself should be organized and lived (Ball 77-78).  The strikes inspired many to 
become labor activists, and as a result membership lists grew in every confédération. The 
unions became increasingly powerful during this time, but would soon lose steam. 
 During the 1970s, the defeated left and succeeding right-wing presidents, Georges 
Pompidou and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, combined with a large economic crisis, created 
many problems for the newly empowered confédérations.  The economic crisis that 
  16 
stemmed from the 1973 oil crisis and the end of the post-World War II economic boom 
ultimately affected much of the Western world. Chapman, Kesselman, and Schain 
explain that after the crisis hit France, manufacturing jobs disappeared, unemployment 
rates soared, and the male blue-collar workforce that had long been the mainstay of the 
labor movement dwindled in size.  Chapman, Kesselman, and Schain continue to argue 
that the right-wing presidents who during this time favored employers and enacted strong 
capitalistic and industrial reforms to combat the crisis caused many confédérations to 
restore back to their traditional defensive posture, lacking the desire to unanimously 
lobby for new labor policies (12).  Membership in all of the confederations dropped by 
two-thirds after the mid-1970s (Schain 13).  The election of the first socialist president of 
the fifth republic, François Mitterrand, gave hope to unions, but because they were locked 
out of decision making for so long, they now competed for policy influence in the leftist 
government, creating rivalries and disputes (Chapman, Kesselman, and Schain 15).  The 
unions could no longer simply unite and oppose policies of the right together.   
The Great Deception of Union Participation Rates 
 After 50 years of decline, just over 8% of workers in France belonged to a trade 
union in 2006 (“Power Without Responsibility”).  In his article “French Unions: Myth & 
Realities,” Schain claims that “the French trade union movement is perhaps the weakest 
in Europe, and certainly from the point of view of membership.”  Schain supports this 
argument by showing that the only other nation that comes close to France’s low union 
participation rate of 8% is the United States with 13% (13).  Even though the power of 
the French unions appears relatively weak, workers actually still obtain substantial 
power.  This power is supported by the enormous masses that gather and strike, often 
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halting the French market and the daily routines of major cities.  In France, public 
support for strike action has often been far stronger than in countries in which unions are 
considerably stronger (Schain 12).  Greeman explains that this power is simply part of the 
greater French culture and embodies a still-living revolutionary tradition of popular mass 
mobilization and struggle that began hundreds of years ago (9).  Polly Platt similarly 
explains this cultural idea.  “History envelops everything in France, including business.  
French people live and breathe it”(103).  The historical legacy of inequality in France 
plays a large role in influencing labor movements.  When French workers feel as if they 
are being treated unfairly, they unite to protest and fight for their welfare, and they do so 
with passion. 
 The recent presence of substantial strikes in the midst of low union participation 
rates validates the determination and power of the French labor force.  In December of 
1995, virtually all transport, civil service workers, and teachers in the country were on 
strike to protest the government’s plan to cut pensions and dismantle the 50-year-old 
policy of financing health care (Krishnan).  Schain, who was in Paris at the time, 
describes his experience.   
The strikes went on for weeks.  In December, it is not light much before 9 a.m. in 
Paris, and so hundreds of thousands of people filled the gloomy streets each morning 
and evening, trying to get to and from work on foot or by bicycle.  In the dark 
morning mist, it looked like the opening of an Eisenstein film. The government 
provided some army trucks for the more adventurous, as well as water transport along 
the Seine. (12) 
In the end, the strikes proved successful, and the cuts were rescinded (Greeman 9).  Even 
though strikes disrupt the lives of plenty of people, as depicted during the demonstrations 
of 1995, the French still show support due to the popular goals of increased worker well-
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being that they strive to achieve.  The majority of the French public understands that the 
primary role of unions is to defend their members’ interests, and clear majorities are in 
favor of unions’ exerting more, rather than less, power in the workplace through strikes 
(Schain 14). 
 Another example of massive demonstrations in recent history was in 2010, and 
many refer to it as the French “Hot Autumn.”  After the government announced it would 
increase the minimum retirement age from 60 to 62, protests began: great numbers of 
workers took to the streets several times in just a few months; high school students 
surprisingly joined in to defend retirement at age 60; and public opinion both supported 
the protests and faulted President Sarkozy for intransigence.  French trade unions had 
managed to mobilize between 1 million and 3.5 million people on ten separate occasions 
between 27 May and 6 November 2010 (Ancelovici 121). Strikes such as this only 
reiterate the idea that French workers have great capabilities to powerfully show 
opposition when the government threatens to decrease or remove aspects of their— 
historically well deserved— welfare. 
 In this chapter I have explained how the strong history of inequality in France led 
to powerful worker mobilization through union formation, and more importantly, strikes.  
This power gives workers opportunity to play an important role in swaying political 
agendas and labor policies.  The strength of workers and their ultimate goal of increased 
worker well-being can be seen through the 35-hour workweek.  In the following chapter, 
I will provide detailed information about the French 35-hour workweek and discuss the 
involvement of unions and political parties in creating the policy.  I will also explain how 
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aspects of the policy were designed to benefit worker well-being, and as should now be 
expected, produced passionate support from the majority of the French labor force. 
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CHAPTER 2: The 35-hour Workweek in France 
“The primary meaning of the French word compromis is a faux-ami, i.e. it does not 
translate into ‘compromise’ but rather into something like ‘a potentially bad deal that 
one might be ashamed to make public.’  ‘Compromising’ in French sometimes conveys a 
taste of ‘losing’… or at least ‘losing face’…” 
-Jean Claude Guez 
French Executive; Andersen Consulting 
  
 The plan for a reduced workweek, and eventually the 35-hour workweek, was a 
process that spanned over two decades under several presidents belonging to different 
parties and was met with both opposition and support from government officials and 
unions alike.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are two, opposing types of unions.  The 
earliest, most common, and influential are the trade, or employees’, unions who hold 
potential of gathering enormous, revolutionary masses.  The other is much smaller, but 
quite often holds more power and wealth, the employer unions.  Similar to politics, 
opposing parties clash at almost everything, and sides must be taken. Fluctuations in 
economic growth and slumps paired with an already exceedingly controversial topic such 
as unemployment, created an ideal priority for unions to debate and political candidates 
to mold campaigns around.  Propelled by the ideology of the left, the 35-hour solution to 
economic and employment issues sparked debate, and often created strong alliances 
between unions and politicians with similar opinions of the policy.   
The Birth of the 35-hour Workweek: A Better Policy for France 
 The first regulation of the workweek in France occurred after the February 
Revolution of 1848 and resulted in a maximum working day of 12 hours.  In addition, 
after the victory of the Popular Front in 1936, the working time was limited to 40 hours 
per week (Labrune, Toutain, and Zwang 84).  Many years later, Socialist President 
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François Mitterrand aimed to reduce the workweek more with la réduction du temps de 
travail, or RTT in 1981.  Mitterrand's government both reduced the length of the 
workweek from 40 to 39 hours, without loss in workers’ pay, and introduced a fifth week 
of paid vacation (Estevão and Sá, “The 35-hour workweek” 422).  He believed that this 
would increase employment within France, and for the same reasons he hoped to adopt a 
35-hour workweek by 1985 (Askenazy, “France’s 35-Hour Workweek” 30).  The idea of 
reduced working time was followed by several other laws, which eventually led to 
Mitterrand’s goal of 35-hour workweek.  
 Many years later, as the unemployment rate rose to 12%, the Robien law was 
accepted by the conservative government of President Jacques Chirac in 1996 (Askenazy, 
“France’s 35-Hour Workweek 30).3  The law offered large financial incentives for firms 
to create new jobs or preserve existing ones through work sharing, with the main aim of 
increasing employment, but also improving working conditions and facilitating the 
reconciliation between work and family life (Durand 11).  Firms that reduced hours by 10 
percent and increased employment by at least 6 percent received significant lower payroll 
taxes (Askenazy, “France’s 35-Hour Workweek” 30).  The Robien law was not expected 
to be met with huge success.  It merely introduced incentives with no regulations and 
worked primarily as a trial run.  Nonetheless, the Robien law was the first step, 
promoting a plan for employment gains without forcing significant costs on businesses, 
and at first glance, it appeared to be the perfect fix. 
 After the dissolution of Parliament by Chirac, the left-wing victories of the 
legislative elections of 1997 led to the naming of Lionel Jospin as Prime Minister and a 
                                                
3  His party affiliation was with the Union for a Popular Movement. 
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5-year cohabitation that helped guide the policy into greater action (Labrune, Toutain, 
and Zwang 140).  Headed by Jospin, the left validated the 35-hour workweek with a 
réalisme de gauche (realism of the left), which acknowledged globalization’s constraints 
and the need to maintain business profitability and competitiveness, yet insisted that 
some room to maneuver remained for activist pursuit of social-democratic goals (Clift 
325-37).4  The Jospin government believed that economic growth alone would not fix the 
12% unemployment rate rapidly enough and therefore introduced activist measures to 
make growth “richer in jobs” (Freyssinet 30-32).  Aiding the economy with employment 
growth, while also improving worker welfare aligned with réalisme de gauche, but 
business profitability and competitiveness still needed to be maintained, and additional 
capital was critical to fund the policy. 
 The solution to maintain a competitive economy and financial stability originated 
from the concept of a link between shorter, but also more flexible work hours.  Based on 
the 1986 Taddei Report of the Socialists, more flexible work hours for individual 
employees and longer operating hours for French firms would, in effect, make machines 
work longer while individuals became more productive and worked less.  More extensive 
use of capital equipment and new shift arrangements were believed to help enhance 
productive capacity and increase the return on capital (Hayden 506).  These gains would, 
in turn, help deliver lower prices, increase market share for French firms, and most 
importantly deliver a reduced workweek with little or no loss in pay (Hayden 506).  The 
center-right also recognized that an increase in employment would result in vast savings 
on the direct and indirect costs of joblessness, such as unemployment benefits, and also 
                                                
4 The left in this sense, includes the Socialist, Green, and Communist parties. 
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produce new tax revenues (Larrouturou).  It appeared that shorter and more flexible hours 
created the perfect equation to increase employment, leisure, and business 
competitiveness, all while funding itself.  The fact that a cohabitation government worked 
together to produce and implement a policy not only provides evidence of diverse 
support, but also hope for success and public approval.  The rollout of the policy to the 
greater population did not go as smoothly. 
 In 1998, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin’s government moved forward to mandate 
the 35-hour workweek and introduced the Aubry I law.  Aubry I included a reduction of 
the standard workweek to 35 hours by January 1, 2000 for large firms and 2002 for small 
firms;5 financial incentives for private-sector firms that reduced hours before the 2000 
and 2002 deadlines; a call to labor unions and employers to launch sector-wide and firm-
level negotiations on the reduced work week; and a future second law that would be 
based on the experience of said negotiations (Bilous 30-31).  The law provided financial 
incentives through government subsides, with the goal of increasing support for the 35-
hour workweek both as a general policy and during the negotiations that were to follow 
and ultimately determine the fate of the law (Askenazy, “France’s 35-Hour Workweek” 
31).  The progression of the 35 hour week through Aubry I ignited an aggressive 
nationwide argument that would endure through new laws, amendments, and political 
campaigns.  The great idea that fostered such hope and excitement of a successful 35 
hour week was suddenly vulnerable to scrutiny from the great power holders in France—
politicians and most importantly, the French unions.  After all was said and done during 
the Aubry II negotiations, the idea might have been too good to be true. 
                                                
5 Large firms have more than 20 employees; small firms have less than 20 employees. 
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Dismantling the 35-hours: Complexity and Controversy 
 During the deliberations that followed the Aubry I law, the employer 
organizations and labor unions pushed for different adjustments that would benefit their 
demands. The trade unions were divided on some issues, but ultimately supported the 
policy, pushing the slogan “35 hours pays 39," and only demanding that worker income 
continue to be maintained as hours were reduced (Estevão and Sá, “The 35-hour 
workweek” 422).  Many unions even agreed to a partial wage freeze for one to three 
years to demonstrate support for the policy (Durand and Martin 12).   In contrast, 
MEDEF,6 the main employers union, and many major corporations counted on the 
complete failure of Aubry I to undermine the entire project; they believed that most firms 
would not begin to reduce hours, and the government would then be forced to abandon 
the project (Askenazy, “France’s 35-Hour Workweek” 31).  As avid support from 
employees and their unions surfaced, MEDEF began to see benefits in negotiating, and 
called for limits to the extent of reduced hours and hiring, while gaining as much 
flexibility as possible (Askenazy, “Working time regulation” 157).  As negotiations 
continued, flexibility was positioned as a crucial issue to employers, employers unions, 
and quite often the politicians of the right. 
 Even though the idea of flexible hours was supported by Socialists in the initial 
phases of the 35-hour workweek through the Taddei Report, the magnitude of flexibility 
and who that flexibility would actually benefit grew fraudulently.  Employer 
organizations had a different idea about reducing working hours and the definition of 
“work time,” one that attempted to avoid a major work time reduction by creating 
                                                
6 Mouvement des Entreprises de France, or Movement of French Enterprises. 
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loopholes in the law.  These organizations wanted the definition of work time to exclude 
“unproductive” breaks, holidays, and training periods so that it would be possible to 
reach 35-hours with a reduction that was substantially lower than the government’s goal 
of 10 percent (Askenazy, “France’s 35-Hour Workweek 32).  The substantial, assertive 
strategies of employers led to some key concessions that ultimately added great flexibility 
to Aubry I. 
 In 2002, after the negotiations, Aubry II was released with many relaxed changes.  
The new law did appeal to the call of employees’ unions and created a guarantee for 
employees earning the legal minimum wage, which was designed to prevent a fall in their 
real incomes as a result of shorter working hours, while also cutting payroll taxes for 
French firms in order to offset the impact of this income guarantee on costs and 
competitiveness (Durand and Martin 11-12).  Although the minimum wage was upheld to 
support the employees, the more substantial changes involved concessions to the 
employers unions.  Anders Hayden explains the key concessions.  First, instead of 
reducing hours by at least 10%, firms only had to reach 35 hours, which led to 
exploitation of work-time calculations (509).  It should also be noted that the reduction 
could take the form of a 1,600-hour work year, as long as weekly hours did not exceed 48 
or an average of 44 over 12 weeks, allowing for a generous amount of flexibility.  
Second, the need to create a minimum number of jobs in return for payroll tax cuts was 
also eliminated (509).  Finally, a transition period was allowed before the full application 
of overtime limits and penalties (510).7  Aubry II added relaxed modifications to the 
                                                
7 In the year 2000 (2002 for small firms), overtime hours would attract a premium of 10 percent, 
with the full 25 percent premium only applied in 2001 (or 2003).  Similarly, the government gave 
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original idea, creating loopholes that benefited employers more than the employee unions 
would have hoped. 
 The changes in Aubry II gave firms greater flexibility in achieving 35 hours, 
while retaining eligibility for government subsides with no requirement to actually 
increase hiring.  This allowed employers to ask workers to work fewer hours some weeks 
and more other weeks as long as the total equaled the 1,600 annual hours specified in the 
Aubry II law.  Philippe Askenazy describes the potential avoidance of the 35-hour 
workweek: 
For instance, some supermarkets excluded three minute breaks (on the hour) for 
cashiers from the calculation of time worked. So they reduced work time officially 
by four hours per week to get to thirty-five hours when it was really a reduction of 
two hours. Hotel and restaurant employees ratified a system of “equivalent hours,” 
which took into account time spent waiting for customers.  So thirty-eight or even 
forty-three hours of work could become “equivalent” to thirty-five hours actually 
worked. (“France’s 35-Hour Workweek” 32) 
 
These loopholes, which employer organizations helped to create, made it possible for 
some companies to avoid paying overtime to employees and hiring needed workers 
during potential seasons of high demand.  Unsurprisingly, this aspect of increased 
flexibility caused controversy within the political community. 
 Original supporters from the left were no longer content and expressed great 
dissatisfaction with the government and its compromise with employers.  According to a 
French Labor Ministry employee, “The government watered down the law’s 
requirements to help ease tensions with hostile elements in the business community” 
(Dayan 171). The left did not seem to be concerned with the reasoning for the 
concessions, but were mainly angered by the amount of flexibility allowed.  Green Party 
                                                                                                                                            
firms two additional years before all hours in excess of 35 per week would count toward the 
annual overtime limit of 130 hours per employee. 
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economic spokesperson Alain Lipietz called the second law a “horror” because of the 
transition period that would only delay hiring and hours reduction (Monnot).  Some 
criticized the lack of worker protection from extreme variations in hours or inadequate 
advance warning of schedule changes (Bulard).  Similarly, some argued that because 
state support was no longer linked to new hiring, employees faced an increased risk of 
work intensification and job stress, undermining the objective of an increased quality of 
life (Bulard).  It is also important to point out that by not linking state support with new 
hiring, government funds ran the risk of being wasted, not being used towards generating 
new jobs, but merely increasing the deficit. The Communist and Green parties, as well as 
some Socialists, threatened not to support the law in Parliament, but eventually retracted 
their statements (Hayden 510). 
 The discontent of unions with Aubry II reflects the frustration of the left, and the 
five major confédérations voiced their opinions. The European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions published some of their opinions.  The 
CFDT was the only major confédération that still had hope of the law’s success in 
reducing working time and creating employment, while also recognizing the opportunity 
for potentially beneficial negotiations between unions.  The largest and strongest, the 
CGT was not satisfied and described the provisions as dangerous; they believed that 
reduction of working hours should be applied to all employees, including managerial and 
professional staff, in both the public and private sector.  The FO was similarly 
disappointed and predicted that the law would threaten stable wage levels and working 
conditions (Bilous).  Aside from the opposition to Aubry II, unions still supported the 
idea of the 35-hour workweek. They continued to recognize the benefits and were willing 
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to fight for a policy that would be best for the worker as one and the economy as a whole.  
Even so, Aubry II, created by negotiations for a more unanimous approval, ran the risk of 
satisfying no one; it began the controversy that now surrounds the 35-hour workweek. 
 After the defeat of the socialists in the legislative elections of 2002, the new 
conservative government headed by Chirac continued to adopt MEDEF’s stance,8 
blaming the 35-hour workweek for the economic slowdown after 2001 and adopting the 
Fillon adjustments in 2003 (Askenazy, “France’s 35-Hour Workweek” 34).  The new law 
undermined incentives for companies to reduce the workweek by reducing the cost of 
overtime and no longer linking decreased social-insurance contributions with a reduction 
in working time (Estevão and Sá, “The 35-hour workweek” 423).9 These changes to the 
original laws ultimately made it easier for companies to remain at a 39-hour workweek at 
no additional cost while still receiving government aid—potentially making the use of 
government funds even more wasteful.10  The Fillon law prompted media reports of the 
35-hour workweek’s death, but Hayden notes that the reports turned out to be greatly 
exaggerated as little movement back towards longer hours ensued (526).  In 2004, Chirac 
referred to the 35-hour workweek as an “established right” and showed little enthusiasm 
for a more significant effort to dismantle it, even calling the latter idea “idiotic” at one 
stage (Husson).  However, in 2005, a new drive from the governing party’s free-market 
wing, led by presidential hopeful Nicolas Sarkozy and backed by MEDEF, produced 
further amendments (Hayden 526). 
                                                
8 The main employer’s union: Mouvement des Entreprises de France 
9 The limit of overtime hours was increased from 130 to 180 hours; compensating overtime 
hours, from hours 36 to 29, in money rather than time off; allowing sector-wide bargaining to set 
overtime premia as low as 10%; and removing the linkage between payroll-tax cuts and 35-hour 
agreements (Braud). 
10 35 hours plus 4 hours of overtime. 
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 After this 2005 draft bill was created to amend the 35-hour workweek adding 
more flexibility, unions organized demonstrations and fought back.  Backed by three of 
the largest worker unions, an estimated 1 million people took part in the demonstration 
across France rallying against the proposed amendments and attempting to protect their 
35-hour workweek rights (“Reform of the 35-hour week”).  Unfortunately for unions, the 
bill passed, still referring to 35-hours as the standard workweek, but giving employers 
several options to turn the clock back to a 39- or 40-hour week in practice (Meilland).11  
Resiliency of the 35-hour workweek could still be seen though, even after the additional 
2005 amendments.  A May 2006 study found that some 1,000 firms—a small number 
compared to the more than 300,000 that introduced a 35-hour week—had taken 
advantage of the previous year’s counter reforms to add extra flexibility to their 35-hour 
agreements (Taupin).12  The fight back by unions might not have been ultimately 
successful in killing the bill, but it appears that their will and ability to resist may have 
caused employers to shy away from utilizing the new amendments.  The conservative 
government was persistent though and continued to strive for the utmost flexibility. 
 After the success of his 2005 bill, Nicolas Sarkozy pushed the slogans “Work 
more to earn more,” “the value of work," and “the France that gets up early” in his 2007 
presidential campaign, swaying public opinions.  After he was elected, he created an 
                                                
11 The 2005 reforms included expanded options for the use of “time savings accounts” to 
accumulate time off, making it easier for time off to be cashed in for money; the right for 
individuals to “choose” longer hours, even beyond the recently increased annual overtime limit of 
220 hours per employee; the ability of firms to buy out managers’ days off on a voluntary basis; 
extension of special provisions for small firms until 2008 instead of 2005; and allowing small 
firms to pay extra WTR days instead of giving them as time off. 
12 The most common change was expanded use of time-savings accounts (79 percent of firms that 
made changes), followed by individual rights to choose longer hours (15 percent) and the 
buyback of time off (5 percent). 
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arrangement that allowed employees to no longer pay taxes on overtime pay and 
employers to pay practically low social insurance contributions on that pay (Askenazy, 
“France’s 35-Hour Workweek” 34).  Askenazy argues that this regulation is only an 
invitation to commit fraud.  “It makes overtime hours less costly to employers, while it 
yields more to workers after taxes than regular hours do.  It gives employers and 
employees a shared interest in reducing basic hourly pay and in declaring the largest 
number possible of false overtime hours” (Askenazy, “France’s 35-Hour Workweek 11).  
The new law created much controversy.  While employers had consistently under-
declared overtime hours, they have been pushed to declare them to benefit from social 
contribution cuts (Askenazy, “Working time regulation” 334).  Because working 
overtime became more beneficial to both employees and employers, it was likely that 
workweek reductions would not occur, and consequently, additional hiring would no 
longer be necessary. It has become clear that the idea of work-sharing is dead.  Most 
private and public workers fear that additional reforms will translate into keeping only 
the welfare-degrading aspects of French regulation.  Even with a mandated 35-hour 
workweek, the amendments that increased flexibility have transformed the law into a 
complex, controversial issue.   
The 35-hour Workweek Today: The Future and Statistics 
 Not much has changed since 2008 regarding the 35-hour workweek.  The election 
of a Socialist President François Hollande was followed in June 2012 by a large “social 
conference”—with no round table on the issue of working time (Askenazy, “Working 
time regulation” 334).  In addition, after a remark made by former Prime Minister Jean-
Marc Ayrault to Le Parisien suggesting a change to the 35-hour workweek, both 
  31 
government officials and unions denounced him.  Trade unions voiced their opposition to 
any measure, with some hinting at action if it were touched.  Labour minister Michel 
Sapin said “Work more to be paid less, is that what the French want?  We must maintain 
the legal work duration to 35 hours” (Lauter).  Even after all of the controversy that 
ensued, it appears that under the current Socialist led government, the 35-hour workweek 
is safe from additional changes creating additional flexibility.  
 Nearing the end of 2014, The New York Times reported that the country was 
reconsidering a more official 35-hour workweek amid reports that the policy is abused by 
employers and is creating financial hardships for employees (Gibson).  This is not a 
surprise, considering the evidence presented earlier.  Because employers benefited the 
greatest from Sarkozy’s version of the 35-hour workweek, they were not pleased with the 
idea reform.  In December of 2014, they responded through demonstrations.  About 8,000 
employers marched throughout France with signs exclaiming “Free Our Businesses” 
claiming that the 35-hour workweek was hindering their profits through employment 
taxes and regulations (Todd). Employee unions were in great opposition to this, insisting 
that businesses were already receiving great tax breaks thanks to the reduced workweek.  
Without the ability to generate great masses like the employee unions and with the 
Socialists finally in power, it is unlikely that these employers’ demands will be met.  If 
anything, there is hope for a protected 35-hour workweek and amendments that will now 
benefit the workers instead. 
 The opposition forces against the 35-hour workweek may have created loopholes 
in which avoidance could occur, but ultimately work time has been decreased, and many 
workers can be pleased with their fight to maintain 35-hours.  Statistics show the 
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decrease in hours worked and the relation of annual working hours compared to different 
countries throughout the world.  In 2004, France recorded one of the steepest declines in 
annual hours worked over the past decade, mainly reflecting the impact of the 35-hour 
workweek (Durand and Martin 11).  In 2013, the average annual hours actually worked 
per person in France was 1,489 while 1,770 hours was the average for OECD countries, 
and 1,788 hours in the US (OECD Labor Stat Extracts).  The total amount of hours has 
decreased in France, and is still fairly lower than the average for most OECD countries, 
but the decrease was halted, with the introduction of the Fillon adjustments in 2003 and 
Sarkozy’s changes in 2007.  In the past decade, France recorded the highest number of 
average annual hours actually worked per person in 2008, just after Sarkozy’s 
modifications (OECD Labor Stat Extracts).  It should be noted that these numbers may 
not completely represent the actual annual hours, because of the increase in fraudulent 
behavior by both employees and employers, as described by Askenazy earlier.  Figures 1 
and 2 below continue to show this trend of hourly fluctuations after laws and 
amendments occurred.   Nonetheless, data have proven that the 35-hour workweek in 
France has been effective in actually reducing hours worked, even with controversy and 
amendments that were created by the change of political parties in Parliament and 
throughout presidencies.   
 In the past decade, the 35-hour workweek has been debated by many and 
transformed so that it is not necessarily required by all employers, but it is still important 
to measure the effectiveness of the policy.  In the following chapter, I will investigate the 
policy in terms of economic efficiency, discovering if the policy is actually effective in 
increasing employment, which was the main reason for the enactment of the law in the 
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beginning.  One reason the law received so much support from unions was because of the 
potential to decrease unemployment, so it is important to understand if this goal was 
reached, benefiting both the economy and the workers.  By further examining the 
economic effect of the 35-hour workweek in France, it can be determined if the policy 
would be more beneficial with improved, stricter regulations, or if the policy itself is 
hindering the French economy.  
Figure 1: 
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Figure 2: 
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CHAPTER 3: Economic Effects of the 35-Hour Workweek 
 
“Once you get used to it, it’s pretty nice, all of that time off.  And not being stressed 
about being late.  It all gets done, somehow, and done well.  Maybe, you know, their lives 
are more—well, meaningful than ours.” 
-American Systems Engineer in a Computer International Firm  
In Polly Platt’s French or Foe? 
 
Rationale for Boosting Economy 
 In addition to attempting to improve working conditions and facilitate the 
reconciliation between work and family life, the 35-hour workweek was adopted with a 
main economic goal of decreasing unemployment.  Between 1980 and 1998, the number 
of unemployed workers in France increased from 1.50 million to 3.55 million, peaking 
officially at 12.6% in 1995, and the labor force participation rate fell faster than anywhere 
else in the rich world (Smith 1).  Clearly, France had an unemployment problem and the 
35-hour workweek was believed to be the perfect fix.  The policy aimed at reducing 
unemployment through work sharing— by trading off fewer work hours per worker for a 
greater number of workers employed (Erbas and Sayers 3).  In addition, some expected 
hourly productivity to increase as firms reorganized production methods and workers 
increased their work effort (Durand and Martin 12).  At first glance, the idea appears 
simple to understand.  An increase in worker welfare, employment, and productivity 
seems beneficial to all of society, but like almost all government mandated labor policies, 
complexity is guaranteed.  In this chapter I will explore numerous economic effects of the 
35-hour workweek and determine if the policy accomplished its main goal of fighting 
unemployment. 
  The broad consensus among studies was that if the reduction in hours was 
accompanied by policies that served to counteract the negative impacts, employment 
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would rise. The primary negative impact of the policy was the cost to both employees and 
employers. The first issue that had to be resolved was the potential decrease in income of 
workers who would suddenly lose 5 hours of working time.  Employees were expected to 
bear only a small part of the cost of the working-time reduction.  As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, they would continue to earn roughly the same monthly income, and workers 
who received the hourly minimum wage (SMIC) would receive no less (Estevão and Sá, 
“The 35-hour workweek”).  As for firms, which would experience increased labor costs 
after maintaining current workers’ salaries and hiring additional workers, government 
subsidies were provided to offset the loss to firms. 
 Although the additional costs to employees and employers were for the most part, 
covered by government subsidies, the burden of increased labor costs would mainly fall 
on the government.  The subsidy plan is an expensive one, and for every firm to receive 
benefits, the government should have to either create new funds, or reallocate existing 
funds. As previously stated in chapter 2 though, the policy was designed to succeed with 
only minimal additional costs.  As the Taddei Report of 1986 pointed out, new flexible 
shift arrangements should have led more extensive use of capital equipment and 
increased returns on capital (Hayden 506).  In addition, an increase in employment could 
result in savings from unemployment benefits, and produce new tax revenues from the 
newly generated jobs.  These concepts are highly important, and in order for the 35-hour 
workweek to work without substantially increasing the government deficit, jobs would 
have to be created—both to help fund the increased costs and make the expense 
worthwhile.  
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 The subsidy plan of the French government is complex.  As firms reduce hours, 
the reduction could follow one of two directions.  One result involves an increase in 
productivity of each worker.  If workers become more productive working fewer hours, it 
is possible for the increased productivity to produce the same amount of output as before 
the hour reductions.  In this case, additional hiring would not necessarily be needed; but, 
because productivity increased, the subsidy would then be used to increase the wages of 
workers.  Evidence of basic economic theory and historical empirical data supports this 
result and shows that as productivity increases, there is a positive effect on wages, and 
wages increase as well.  The other result of hour reductions is increased employment.  If 
worker productivity remains constant, it would then be necessary for firms to hire 
additional workers to maintain their previous output.  In this case, the subsidy would be 
used to fund the hiring costs and wages of additional workers.  This is a simplified idea 
though, and reality is complicated.  Specific to the 35-hour workweek, the many 
amendments relaxed the original policy, and the minimum requirements for job creation 
and hour reductions were almost removed entirely.  In this case, it is difficult to 
determine where firms actually used the subsidies.  
 The predictions of the 35-hour workweek to increase employment and 
productivity highlight the subsidy allocation mystery, but nonetheless show the diversity 
of effects that the policy produces.  Because the main economic goal of the 35-hour 
workweek was to increase employment, I will focus on these results while paying 
attention to the possibility of other economic effects.  By examining the outcomes of 
previous research and then comparing these results with current data and my own 
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research, I hope to measure the extent of the effect of the 35-hour workweek on 
unemployment.  
Past Research, Opinions, and Predictions 
 The Left promised not only a better quality of life for workers, but also an 
increase in employment, financially supported by greater productivity.  The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) conducted research to discover the effects of a reduction in the 
workweek accompanied by an employment subsidy.  This general research is not based 
on the French model, but provides evidence that the policy can be successful in the short 
run. By comparing their basic findings to the French model, we can determine if the 
policy had the potential for success.  Erbas and Sayers developed an analytical 
framework of a comparison static model of demand for workers and demand for work 
hours, including overtime (6).  The model shows that a rise in short term employment can 
be created, but its success depends greatly on the subsidy that is allotted to firms. Without 
a subsidy, employment can only rise if wages per worker decline enough to offset the 
increased costs of hiring additional workers to make up for the reduction in hours per 
employee.  In practice, the subsidy should offset the costs of maintaining current 
workers’ wages and hiring additional workers. Therefore, this research greatly stresses 
the importance of an effective subsidy in order for the 35-hour workweek to increase 
employment in the short run. 
 The IMF’s model focuses on the ability to create downward wage flexibility and 
downward wage rigidity, both of which allow for an increase in employment.  Downward 
wage flexibility means that workers are willing to take a cut in wages in return for more 
leisure and, possibly, for higher employment (Erbas and Sayers 17).  A degree of 
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downward wage flexibility is extremely important, because even though a sustained 
income was guaranteed for those earning the minimum wage in France, a drop in income 
was more likely for higher skilled workers earning greater wages.  Without at least some 
retention of original income or a willingness to trade income for leisure, employees 
experiencing a reduction in hours, and potentially income, have the ability to take on a 
second job.  If workers are unhappy and choose to take on a second job, then there is little 
hope for increased total employment, because the new jobs created from the workweek 
reduction would be shared between the unemployed and already employed. 
 It is important to note the potential French exception that is not included in the 
research by Erbas and Sayers.  The major involvement of employees and unions in 
implementing and supporting the policy discussed earlier suggest that the French were 
happy with the reduction in hours and already possessed a degree of wage flexibility. 
They showed a willingness to trade income for leisure, and this was further displayed by 
unions’ agreement to wage freezes for 1-3 years (Pham 6-7).13  This suggests that the 
policy had greater chances of success in decreasing unemployment.  Even with no 
account of this French exception, Eras and Sayers argue that the degree of downward 
wage flexibility necessary to induce an increase in employment is even smaller with the 
accompaniment of a subsidy, because it would help maintain worker income.  Knowing 
that the French policy included subsidies, and most workers desired hour reductions, it 
can be assumed that workers may not have necessarily needed or wanted to search for 
other jobs and were content, strengthening the model’s argument. 
                                                
13 An average of 52 percent of workers agreed to wage freezes in 2000. 
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 In addition to wage flexibility, the IMF model expounds on the significance of 
wage rigidity.  Wage rigidity is the difficulty firms experience when trying to reduce 
wages.  Whether because of a labor agreement or for fears of lost productivity, companies 
find it hard to reduce employee wages or salaries, and many elect to conduct layoffs 
rather than wage reductions when facing losses or lower profits (“Wage Rigidity”).  
Without a subsidy, the initial effect of a mandatory reduction in hours could have led to 
an increase in unemployment, because in some cases, it is easier for firms to simply fire 
employees instead of risking a loss in productivity and output that could result from 
decreased worker wages in a reduced workweek.  The subsidy given to French firms 
eases the burden of additional labor costs while accommodating for downward wage 
rigidity and keeping wages relatively high.  France also has high employment protection 
legislation that protects permanent workers against individual dismissal, includes specific 
requirements for collective worker dismissal, and regulates temporary employment 
contracts (Ohanian and Raffo 9).  In 2008 France ranked 6 out of 40 in the highest level 
of employment protection, minimizing the chance for such layoffs (OECD Labor Stat 
Extracts).  Because the 35-hour workweek was accompanied by subsidies, employment 
protection policies were active, and French workers showed great interest in hours 
reduction with a maintained income, the IMF model provides evidence that employment 
should have been created, notably in France.  
 Economists and statisticians present supporting evidence of the initial success of 
the 35-hour workweek that correlates with the IMF model’s expectations.  The 
unemployment rate did decrease during the crucial years after the implementation of the 
Aubry I and II laws, but the success can also be seen four years earlier with the 
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preliminary incentive-based and voluntary Robien law.  The law created 3,000 collective 
agreements with firms who introduced a 35, or even 32 hour week, with employment 
increasing by 10 percent and, in turn, the law created 33,000 jobs (Aznar 15-28).  The 
incentives provided to firms who both reduced workers’ hours and increased employment 
within the firm appeared to be working.  Economist Michel Husson found that the period 
from mid-1997 to mid-2001, during which employment rose 7.2 percent, saw the biggest 
job gains of any four-year period in twentieth century France (Husson 4).  He also points 
out that during the previous era of sustained growth (1986-1990), annual economic and 
employment growth averaged 3.6 and 1.5 percent, respectively, while during 1997 to 
mid-2001, economic growth was slightly slower at 3.3 percent, but employment grew 
much more rapidly at 2.7 percent (Husson 27).  Economic growth is not the only 
determinant of employment growth, and Husson’s results support the role of the 35-hour 
workweek in boosting employment.  In addition, this data results from the same time 
period of the implementation of the 35-hour workweek and further suggests that the 
policy generated employment growth in France.  Economists Beffy and Forcade provide 
complementary evidence, identifying the 35-hour workweek as a main reason causing 
1993 to 2002 to be more job-intensive than previous decades (3-23).  This evidence 
continues to provide insight into the potential success of the 35-hour work week. 
 There are counterarguments to the influx of employment during this time though; 
and they should be noted.  Some critics argue that an economic boom was responsible for 
creating employment, and not the 35-hour workweek.  Martine Durand and John Martin 
of the OECD point out the initial rise in employment after 1997, but credit the rise to 
favorable economic conditions. They support their argument by referring to the same 
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trend of rising employment across other EU countries (12).  In their 2008 article, “The 
35-hour workweek in France: straightjacket or welfare improvement?” Estevão and Sá 
also argue that strong economic growth and other labor market reforms of the early and 
mid-1990s boosted aggregate French employment in the second half of the 1990s and 
beginning of the 2000s.  They support this argument by showing the probability being 
employed relative to being unemployed between 1993 and 2002 in both large and small 
firms.  After plotting the log of the probability of working in a large or in a small firm 
divided by the probability of being unemployed, the log odds of employment by firm size 
are essentially parallel (447).  The probability of employment in large firms should have 
been greater as a result of their transition to the 35-hour workweek during this time 
period.  Because small firms did not have to make the transition to the 35-hour workweek 
until 2002, Estevão and Sá’s results suggest that the 35-hour workweek had no effect on 
the level of employment.  It should be noted that this study by Estevão and Sá is 
empirical and dependent on the time that small and large firms actually switched to the 
35-hour workweek, and this is hard to determine especially because of the exceptions and 
flexibility later built into the law.  These discrepancies make it hard to validate their 
specific study, but also prove the difficulty in assessing the employment effects of the 35-
hour workweek. 
 Other discrepancies arise from the multiple amendments that added greater 
flexibility into the law.  The changes allowed some firms to stay above 35 hours with no 
greater cost.  For example, automaker PSA Peugeot Citroën had a 38.5 hour week, 
including one hour and 45 minutes in breaks, which it recalculated as a 36 hour and 45 
minute week, allowing it to get to 35 hours with only a small real reduction in hours 
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(Bloch-London 36).  Although dramatic, research by Dayan estimated that the practice of 
excluding breaks could amount, on average, to a difference of about five work days per 
employee per year, equivalent to an estimated 150,000 jobs not created (170).  Samsonite 
workers agreed to workweeks of up to 48 hours in the summer, when demand for luggage 
is high, in return for extra days off and workweeks as low as 32 hours when demand falls 
(Woodruff).  These alternations lessened the need to generate employment, while still 
falling within the flexible boundaries of the amended 35-hour workweek. Because firms 
found ways to avoid reducing individual workers’ hours, it makes it even harder to 
determine the exact effects on employment. 
 By looking at simple data for France during the years of the 35-hour workweek, 
one can observe the trend in the average annual hours, unemployment rate, and GDP.  
Figures 3, 4, and 5 below exhibit this information.  Initially, it appears that concrete 
conclusions can be made.  First, the average annual hours have fallen and this appears to 
support the goal of the 35-hour workweek in reducing hours, but this is misleading.  Yes, 
the 35-hour workweek aimed to reduce workweek hours, but the goal was specifically 
reducing hours per worker, not the total aggregate hours worked of the labor force as a 
whole.  The data do not provide accurate information specific to hours reduction per 
employee, and therefore is not reliable in measuring this effect.   
 The unemployment rate also follows a downward trend, especially after 1998, 
when Aubry I (the first mandated policy) was enacted, and only substantially increases 
after 2007 when the Great Recession occurred, and high unemployment was expected.  
The information appears strong in confirming the positive role of the 35-hour workweek, 
but it is hard to grant all of the success to the policy exclusively.  Other factors could 
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have contributed to these results, and these data do not take into account other potential 
factors. 
 The level of GDP per capita is even more ambiguous.  As I explained earlier, 
increased productivity and increased employment are two somewhat contradicting 
factors, and theoretically the reduced workweek should effect one more than the other—
either increasing productivity or increasing employment— so it is hard to factor the data 
into a valid conclusion.  In addition, historically, GDP should naturally increase steadily 
over time.  As technology improves, productivity should increase as well, leading to a 
higher level of GDP per capita.  The data presented here could merely show the 
increasing trend of GDP that one should expect and not be greatly affected by the 35-
hour workweek.  Even if the conclusions resulting from this data are weak, they provide 
an initial idea of important economic factors in France during the time of the 35-hour 
workweek.  They also provide a basis for my following research, proving that examining 
only general data is not an accurate source of valid conclusions, especially when studying 
a complex policy such as the 35-hour workweek.     
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Figure 3 
 
Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
 
Methodology for Personal Research 
 In order to form more accurate conclusions of the 35-hour workweek’s effects on 
unemployment, I use the similar factors of the average annual hours worked, 
unemployment rate, and GDP growth, or productivity and compare them with the specific 
phases of the 35-hour workweek policy.  Instead of observing the effects of the policy in 
an environment with numerous, differing factors as I did previously with the examination 
of general statistics, now, I observe the effects of the 35-hour workweek in a more 
simplified world.  I do this by testing the impact of specific phases of the 35-hour 
workweek, controlling for all other factors that might also influence their outcome using 
regressions.  In effect, I can isolate whether the outcome is influenced by the treatment of 
the specific phases of the 35-hour workweek and not other factors.  By doing this I can 
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determine the specific form(s) of the policy that produced the most favorable outcomes.  
Earlier I explained that the multiple amendments added great flexibility that watered 
down the original policy, and I hypothesize that these amendments negatively affected 
the original policy, hindering its potential for success.  Hopefully, this research will 
provide some insight confirming my speculation. 
 To examine the effects of the 35-hour workweek, I run regressions using data I 
collected from OECD and the World Bank regarding the average annual hours, 
unemployment rate, and GDP growth, or productivity.  By doing this, I can gauge the 
effect of each phase of the 35-hour workweek on unemployment and average annual 
hours.  I use a basic regression equation to organize and explain the analysis.  The 
regression equation is written as Y= α + βX + ε, where Y is the value of the dependent 
variable; α is a constant and equals the value of Y when the value of X=0; β is the 
coefficient of X, or how much Y changes for each one-unit change in X; X is the value of 
the independent variable(s); and ε is the error in predicting the value of X.  Specifically, I 
use the two regression equations written below, substituting the ensuing 5 policies for 
policy 1 before each run: 
Unemployment Ratet = α + β1 GDP Growth t-1 + β2 Average Annual Hours t-1 + β3 Policy 1  + εt 
Average Annual Hourst = α + β1 GDP Growth t-1 + β2 Unemployment Rate t-1 + β3 Policy 1  + εt 
 Table 1 and 2 below show the results of the regressions on unemployment and 
average annual hours.  The coefficient explains the marginal effect of each policy.  The 
p-value represents the statistical significance testing of the effects, reporting an 
assessment as to whether the observed scores reflect a pattern other than chance.   If the 
p-value is less than 0.1, the coefficient is considered to be statistically significantly 
different from zero, and the results are unlikely to have occurred by chance.  If the p-
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value is greater than 0.1, the statistical test proves that the coefficient has no effect, and 
the results are rejected.  Table 3 provides a summary of the six key dates that I believe 
are relevant to the transformation of the 35-hour workweek, and could have potentially 
affected its success. 
 
Table 1 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Unemployment    Coefficient   p-value 
———————————————————————————————————— 
Unemployment Rate        0.186   0.475 
Average Annual Hours       0.769   0.973 
GDP Growth        -0.136   0.306 
1996: Robien Law       -0.479   0.589 
1998: Aubry I        -1.537   0.083 
2000: Deadline #1 for Aubry I     -2.427   0.080 
2002: Deadline #2 and Aubry II     -0.568   0.593 
2003: Fillon Adjustments      -0.429   0.648 
2007: Sarkozy Adjustments      -1.436   0.115 
 
Table 2 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Average Annual Hours   Coefficient   p-value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Unemployment Rate        0.001   0.828 
Average Annual Hours       0.355   0.174 
GDP Growth         2.140   0.999 
1996: Robien Law       -0.004   0.695 
1998: Aubry I        -0.006   0.532 
2000: Deadline #1 for Aubry I     -0.015   0.309 
2002: Deadline #2 and Aubry II     -0.018   0.143 
2003: Fillon Adjustments       0.020   0.067 
2007: Sarkozy Adjustments       0.015   0.132 
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Table 3 
1996: Robien Law Trial run that introduced incentives with no 
regulations.  Firms that reduced hours by 10% and 
increased employment by at least 6% received 
significant lower payroll taxes. 
1998: Aubry I Legally mandated reduction of the standard 
workweek to 35-hours by January 1, 2000 for large 
firms and 2002 for small firms.  Financial 
incentives were provided for private-sector firms 
that reduced hours before the 2000 and 2002 
deadlines. 
2000: Deadline #1 for Aubry I At this time, all large firms have reduced the 
workweek to 35 hours.  
2002: Deadline #2 for Aubry I and 
          Aubry II 
At this time, under Aubry I, all small firms should 
have reduced the workweek to 35 hours.  
Guarantee for employees earning minimum wage 
of no fall in income.  Instead of reducing hours by 
10%, firms only had to reach 35 hours, or a 1600 
hour work year, as long as weekly hours did not 
exceed 48 or an average of 44 over 12 weeks. The 
need to create a minimum number of jobs in return 
for payroll tax cuts was eliminated. 
2003: Fillon Adjustments The limit of overtime hours was increased, the cost 
of overtime was reduced, and decreased social 
security contributions were no longer linked with a 
reduction in working time.  
2007: Sarkozy Adjustments Employees no longer pay taxes on overtime pay 
and employers pay practically low social insurance 
contributions on that pay.  
 
 
 The results of my analysis support my original hypothesis.  The amendments to 
the 35-hour workweek did negatively affect the original employment success of the 
policy.  In Table 1 the statistically significant coefficients are those that correspond with 
Aubry I in 1998 and the first deadline of Aubry I in 2000.  The analysis shows that these 
two key dates most greatly affected the unemployment rate in France, and together 
decreased the unemployment rate by roughly 4 percentage points. The previous data 
displayed this change, and the regression validates the importance of the 35-hour 
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workweek in causing this effect.  The succeeding dates did not appear to have any effect 
on unemployment, and this can be expected because each additional amendment only 
added greater flexibility to the policy, making it easier for firms to avoid hiring new 
workers. 
 The results of Table 2 show the effects of the amendments on average annual 
hours worked.  The only date for which the coefficient was statistically significant was 
2003 when the Fillon adjustments were enacted.  Because the amendment both increased 
the limit of overtime and reduced the cost of overtime, and no longer linked decreased 
social-insurance contributions with a reduction in working time, an increase in the 
average annual hours worked can be anticipated.  Many firms were able to return to 
longer hours than were originally allowed under Aubry I with no penalty.  The increase is 
significant, but small.  This suggests that overall the policy did not greatly affect the 
average annual hours worked in France, and this should be expected.  Workweek 
reductions per individual may have decreased because of the 35-hour workweek, but total 
hours of the entire labor force should remain relatively the same.   
 The information presented in this chapter, and the results of the regressions 
support the initial success of the 35-hour workweek in France.  The amendments that 
were added negatively affected this initial success that the original policy produced.  The 
change of political power from left to right and the government’s favor of employers led 
to the amendments and ultimately halted any future gains in employment.  A stronger 35-
hour workweek that includes minimum requirements of workweek reductions and job 
creation that are linked to subsidy allocation decreases unemployment the greatest.  
Without these requirements, it is unlikely that the 35-hour workweek affects employment 
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at all.  In the next chapter I study the effects of the 35-hour workweek on workers’ 
quality of life, while similarly recognizing the impact of the amendments on this effect.  
The amendments may have put an end to the employment success, but now I hope to 
discover if they were strong enough to hinder the quality of life of workers.  Concerning 
French workers, the popularity of the 35-hour workweek has appeared to revolve around 
this aspect, as it follows the historical idea that envelops French culture— life, not work, 
is of utmost importance.                     
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CHAPTER 4: The Social Effects of the 35-hour Workweek 
“Global capitalism’s relentless competitive pressures are forcing employees 
around the world to work longer and harder to hold onto their jobs, beyond the 
limits of what their bodies, families, friendships, and psyches can tolerate”  
          -Pietro Basso 
Modern Times, Ancient Hours: Working Lives in the Twenty-first Century 
“French employees’ attempts to hold onto their 35-hour week are doomed in a 
competitive global economy.” 
-Thomas Friedman 
 New York Times 
 
 In the last chapter I argued that the first goal of the 35-hour workweek in 
increasing unemployment was not met with great success.  In this chapter I hope to 
address the policy’s second goal of increased worker well-being by determining who the 
35-hour workweek actually benefits, and to what extent.  These goals of increased 
economic efficiency— through high employment— and increased quality of life can be 
considered contradictory though.  As the quotes above suggest, and as Anders Hayden 
explains, “Even as people worry about losing time for family, community, and 
themselves, there is a tendency to believe that sacrificing quality of life is necessary to 
“succeed” in today’s global economy” (503).  This is important, and most of the French 
labor force appears to be more concerned with the increased quality of life.  As I have 
shown in earlier chapters, French workers generally support and fight to protect labor 
policies that benefit their well-being and this same determination remained active during 
and after the implementation of the 35-hour workweek.  By analyzing the effects of the 
35-hour workweek on quality of life, and distinguishing both the winners and losers 
while gauging the magnitude of these results, we can determine if the policy was 
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successful in increasing worker well-being, and if the effort of employees to protect the 
policy were well worth the time and energy that was spent. 
The Rationale for Increased Worker Well-Being 
 The French Socialist government believed that the 35-hour workweek would 
relieve workers of stress related to long hours, and grant free time that would benefit their 
quality of life.  The goal was to both create jobs and free up time away from the job to 
allow workers to live healthy, dignified, and high quality lives (Hayden 506).  Lonnie 
Golden describes more broadly that the public good case for a policy that induces shorter 
hours of work per employee is only a logical extension from evidence of the adverse 
effects stemming from excessively long hours of work on workers’ stress, work/life 
balance, and productivity per hour—highlighting the high risk of detrimental effects to 
mental and physical health (1181, 1184).  He also notes that excessive hours have other 
negative externalities, such as public health risks, and crowding out of time that has a 
beneficial social and economic purpose as human and social capital development, such as 
time for parenting, civic activity, and studying (1185).  The French had taken the first 
step to eliminate some of these negative results of long work hours by adopting the 35-
hour workweek, but in order for the policy to prove successful, it must be specifically 
designed to improve the well-being of all French workers. 
 In his article, Golden also provides suggestions for a successful policy, stating 
that a shorter workweek may improve workers’ well-being if it creates more total 
employment opportunities; allows more free time to be used at employees’ discretion and 
gives them greater control over work, is accompanied by partial income replacement, and 
is well targeted toward workers who prefer shorter hours than they are currently working 
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(1181).  We are already familiar with the outcome of two of these suggestions, but they 
present contradicting results.  As I showed in the last chapter, substantial employment 
was not created, and this undermines one of Golden’s suggestions for the potential of 
success.  On the other hand, and as I also explained earlier, the policy was accompanied 
by partial income replacement, and this supports the potential for success outlined by 
Golden.  I will address the other issues later in this chapter, but it is also important to note 
Golden’s last assumption.  He makes clear that the welfare loss due to the decrease in 
income of some workers may be offset almost entirely by the time gained, depending on 
how such extra time is used (1185).  By better understanding who the 35-hour workweek 
benefitted and how, we can continue and take a general economic stance to solving this 
problem—as long as those who benefit from the change gain more than the losers lose, 
the policy would ultimately prove to be desirable. 
 A 1997 survey of French employees helps explain workers’ initial attitudes 
towards the 35-hour workweek in regard to the increased amount of free time from 
reduced work hours.  The data showed that higher-income earners were more willing to 
sacrifice purchasing power to work less, less affluent individuals were prepared to accept 
such a trade-off on the condition that it created new jobs, and the least affluent were 
generally opposed to any policy that required income sacrifices (Hayden 518).  
Comparable to Golden’s suggestions, two similar issues arise from this information.  
Because the 35-hour workweek did not really create a substantial number of jobs, it 
appears that less affluent individuals would not be supportive of the reduction in hours, 
even if it increased their free time.  The other issue results from the least affluent 
worker’s views.  Due to the fact that the income of minimum wage workers was 
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maintained, and the least affluent workers should be the same workers earning this wage, 
it can be deduced that the least affluent should have still experienced gains from extra 
free time without income sacrifices thanks to the 35-hour workweek.  This data also 
seems to foreshadow the formation of inequalities, depending on the types of workers 
who were both pleased with and benefited from the 35-hour workweek.  All of this is 
contingent on the allocation and extent of hours reduction, and as previously discussed, 
the many amendments to the original policy that created great flexibility ultimately made 
hour reductions ambiguous across the spectrum of workers.  This adds to the already 
prominent difficulties in gauging one’s well-being. In order establish clearer effects of 
the 35-hour workweek on workers’ quality of life, I will look at the policy’s influence on 
the time spent at work and away. 
How the French Used their New Free Time 
 Because the 35-hour workweek allowed greater free time, it is useful to 
understand how the time was utilized in contributing to greater societal welfare.  As 
Golden mentioned, this use of free time is crucial, and holds the potential to compensate 
for other possible negative effects.  One optimistic media report refers to the “French 
miracle” of a “shorter week, more jobs, and men doing the ironing,” while economist 
Nicolas Baverez claims that studies prove that “for the lowest social strata, free time 
leads to alcoholism, violence, and delinquency” (Hayden 520).  The latter idea leads to 
legitimate concerns, potentially overturning the positive benefits that society was 
expected to obtain.  The results appear to be less drastic, though.  Anders Hayden notes 
that workers have largely devoted additional time to previously existing activities, 
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notably spending time with family and children, and resting (520).14  As for the 
distribution of domestic labor in the home, men have not necessarily increased ironing, 
but women still account for most of the housekeeping.15  One promising change is the 
more time allowed to both genders for parenting—63% of women, and 52% of men, with 
children under 12 say they spend more time overall with their children (Méda and Orain 
95).  In addition, it has allowed many women to free up their weekends and experience 
more leisure time by allowing some domestic tasks to be completed during the week 
(Cette, Dromel, and Méda 120). 
 As free time has increased, short-term travel has also boomed thanks to the 35-
hour workweek.  Workers have more opportunities to take 3, or 4 day weekends.  The 
national railroad even added extra service on Thursday evenings and Friday mornings to 
handle the new demand for such getaways (Woodruff).   Twenty-eight percent of 35-hour 
workers say that they have been able to travel more on weekends and take short trips, but 
clear distinctions exist:  50% of managers were able to travel more frequently, compared 
to 15 % of unskilled workers (Estrade and Méda 3).  As a journalist from L’humanité put 
it, the 35-hour workweek is undoubtedly a “source of better living…even if this liberated 
time also reveals inequalities” (Clerget).  As we will later see, inequalities existed not 
only in the way free time was spent, but resulted from more rooted causes that involved 
the formation of workweeks and overall working conditions. 
 
                                                
14 Based on data from the RTT et modes de vie survey. 
15 In the RTT et modes de vie survey, among women at 35 hours, 93 percent say they still do most 
of the laundry, 86 percent most of the ironing, and 74 percent most of the meal preparation, 
housekeeping, and shopping.  Since the 35-hours, the number of men who report doing more 
ironing is only 4 percent (the corresponding figure for laundry is 7 percent; meal preparation, 19 
percent; housekeeping, 20 percent; and shopping, 22 percent). 
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Unintended Consequences: Unequal Effects on Workers of Different Skill Levels 
 The 35-hour workweek took a variety of flexible forms, and often, these forms 
corresponded to particular types of workers.  A survey of 1,200 firms after the 
implementation of Aubry I in 2000 found that for non-managers, the most common 
forms, in descending order, were additional days off over the year; shorter workdays; 
“modulation” or “annualization” (which allows companies to vary weekly hours 
throughout the year); days or half-days off on a weekly or bi-weekly basis; and time-
savings accounts (Pham 7-8).  These diverse forms help reveal that the quality of time off 
can vary, depending on who controls when it is taken, and its regularity, predictability, 
and usability.  Often, this quality is more important than the mere quantity of reduced 
hours.  An example of a poor quality of hour reductions can be seen through 
unpredictable schedules at the French automobile firm, PSA Peugeot Citroën.  Workers 
frequently found themselves working on Saturdays without overtime pay when the firm 
needed to boost production, balanced by time off, often on short notice, when demand 
was slack (Hayden 516).  The aforementioned survey found that employees who received 
their time off in the form of regularly scheduled days or half days off, or additional days 
off on an annual basis, were more likely than others to say their lives improved as a result 
of the 35-hour workweek.  In contrast, those whose hours vary over the course of the 
year, often gaining time off when most convenient for their employer and not necessarily 
of value to them, were less likely to say life and working conditions had improved (Pham 
7-8).  This data only emphasizes the importance of quality in workweek reductions to 
benefit worker well-being, and the inequalities that can consequently arise. 
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 Often the forms that the 35-hour workweek can take are connected to the skill 
level of the employee.  This idea gave way to an unintended consequence of the policy, 
and creates the first source of inequality that resulted from the reduced workweek, 
benefiting the well-being some, while damaging the well-being of the others.  A key 
disparity emerges between those who control their schedules and can choose when to 
take time off and those who have it imposed by their employer (Dayan 128).  Employees 
of lower skill-level and social rank often received time of lesser quality because they had 
less control over its scheduling.  Estrade and Ulrich found that after moving to the 35-
hour week, 50% of the managers surveyed said they had total control over when they 
took their time off compared to just 5% of manual workers and employees (74).16 In 
addition, they discovered that although the vast majority of employees’ work schedules 
did not become more irregular due to the 35-hour workweek, lower-skilled employees 
were more likely than others to see increased variability and unpredictability of hours 
(70). They argue that, at a time of high unemployment, these less-skilled workers had 
little bargaining power to resist employer demands for work time flexibility concessions 
in return for the 35-hour week (70).  This idea parallels the many employer-driven 
amendments to the policy that added great flexibility.  Pélisse also notes that frequently, 
less-skilled workers actually felt greater time constraints as employers gained more 
ability to vary schedules according to fluctuations in business activity.  He argues that 
total work hours may have fallen, but these workers did not necessarily feel they were 
working any less or benefiting from it due to the lack of fixed hours and unforeseen last 
minute changes in their schedules (73).  
                                                
16 Based on data from RTT et Modes de Vie survey. 
  59 
 In addition to the formation of workweek reductions, the mixed record of working 
conditions can help determine the overall effect on quality of life. A principal source of 
data regarding this information— that many academics I mentioned earlier studied, such 
as Hayden, Estrade, and Ulrich— is the French labor ministry’s research and statistical 
agency, Direction de l’animation de la recherche, des études et des statistiques 
(DARES).  This agency conducted the RTT et modes de vie survey of 1,618 employees 
who had experienced a 35-hour workweek for at least one year, conducted between 
November 2000 and January 2001.  The survey results show that 45.6% of employees 
said their working conditions had not changed, with the rest nearly equally divided 
between those who experienced an improvement (26.4%) or deterioration (28%).  The 
feeling that working conditions improved was greater among those who said the 35-hour 
workweek enhanced their ability to organize their work, gave them more autonomy in 
their work, and led to new hiring in their work unit.  Employees whose working 
conditions improved also tended to be those that could freely manage their schedules, and 
were most often of a higher qualification and rank.  In contrast, employees who said that 
demands for multitasking increased or that they had to complete the same tasks in less 
time, felt more stressed at work, or faced additional tasks were more likely to see 
working conditions deteriorate.  The lack of new hiring is often contributed to this feeling 
of work intensification (Méda 98-99).  This data highlights similar inequalities that arise 
from the formation of workweeks, or the degree of control over free time, and suggests 
that the well-being of higher-skilled workers is more likely to increase due to the 35-hour 
workweek than lower-skilled workers.  
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An Unexpected Promotion of Gender Equality 
 Although the 35-hour workweek appears to have affected workers of different 
skill level unequally, the results of well-being by gender provide evidence of greater 
equality.  Women in particular have greatly benefited from the reduced workweek in 
France.  Estevão and Sá explain why this may be so. 
For mostly cultural reasons, women have been more attached to raising a family 
and to household tasks than men, and the externality of having to work longer 
hours in the free market equilibrium may be more burdensome to them.  If this 
perception is right, compared to men, women would be working “too much” in 
their main job, and a coordinated reduction in the workweek would allow them to 
spend more time at home without suffering dire consequences in their 
professional life. Thus, relative to men, workweek reduction laws could benefit 
women more. (427)  
 
In addition to creating more gender equality with the improvement of working life for 
women, the reduced workweek allows for greater family time.  Similarly, Jacobs and 
Gerson call for work-time solutions that address the often-conflicting twin goals of work-
family integration and gender equity (115).  In this light, the 35-hour workweek has 
potential to fulfill these criteria, easing the tension of gender inequality in the workplace, 
and allowing both parents to be more involved in raising a family.  The fact that men now 
spend more time at home with children opens up opportunities for a future evolution 
toward greater equality in domestic responsibilities—not to mention the benefits to 
children having both parents more involved in their lives (Hayden 523).  As Méda puts it, 
“with the 35-hour workweek, we have one of the tools that allows us to reconcile the two 
values dear to the hearts of those who govern us: work and family” (101). 
 The introduction of the shorter workweek resulted mainly in women shifting from 
long part-time to the new short full-time standard (Berg, Bosch, and Charest 829).  This 
allowed women with young children to participate as equals in the full-time workforce 
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and ease the struggle to juggle work and family—providing a more egalitarian alternative 
to the second-class status of most part time work or withdrawal from the labor market 
(Hayden 523).  This switch of more women working a full-time standard might have 
aided gender equality, but in turn, it makes women susceptible to the same skill-level 
inequalities that result from workweek formations and work conditions that I discussed 
earlier.  Workweek formations that involve employer control over schedules and the 
allocation of free time, often deteriorating the well-being of lower-skilled workers, are 
particularly damaging to women with family responsibilities.  Women, mainly high-
skilled, benefited greatly if they had more control over the schedule of their free time.  
For example, when given the choice, women with young children prefer to take 
Wednesdays off, when most primary schools are closed (Hayden 516).  In relation to 
working conditions, 42% of female managers experienced improved working conditions, 
but only 21% of unskilled female workers cited improvement (35% spoke of 
deterioration).  This disparity is small among men, and is perhaps greater among women 
because of the cultural intensity of balancing family with work.  Deteriorating work 
conditions add more stress to daily life and can spill over to affect family responsibilities.  
This information proves that although women may ultimately benefit from additional free 
time thanks to the 35-hour workweek, they are still subject to skill-level inequalities, and 
higher-skilled women gain more than lower-skilled women. 
Life Outside the Workplace: Overall Effects on Quality of Life 
 One of the main successes of the 35-hour workweek has been improving quality 
of life overall, above and beyond conditions at work.  The RTT et modes de vie survey— 
considered by Anders Hayden the most comprehensive survey of 35-hour workers, due to 
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the fact that it was conducted before the many amendments were enacted— found that a 
very significant majority had a positive experience overall (522).  Table 4 highlights the 
main effects on the quality of daily life, divided by sex and skill level. 
 
Table 4 
Effect of Workweek Reduction on Quality of Daily Life: Robien and Aubry I 
Employee’s Views 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Sex Employee Category Improvement (%) No Change (%) Deterioration 
(%) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Male  
 Manager       65.0       28.4   6.6 
 Intermediate level      57.1       29.2   13.5 
  
 Skilled worker       56.3       29.4   13.5 
 Unskilled worker      57.4       27.5   15.1 
 Total        58.3       29.0   12.7 
Female 
 Manager       72.7       19.4   7.9 
  
 Intermediate level      73.3            19.3   7.4 
 Skilled worker       60.5       25.5   14.0 
 Unskilled worker      40.2       39.5   20.3 
 Total        61.1       26.0   12.9 
 
Total         59.2       28.0   12.8 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: RTT et modes de vie Survey 
  
 When asked how, on the whole, the 35-hour workweek affected their daily lives 
both at work and outside of work, 59% of workers said their lives had improved, 
compared to only 13% who said their quality of life had deteriorated.  The data shows 
that managers were particularly satisfied, especially female managers with 73% citing 
improvement.  However, the least likely to be satisfied were unskilled female workers 
(40% saw improvement and 20% spoke of deterioration). The data proves that the 
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formation of inequalities that I discussed earlier ultimately remain, but even among the 
least satisfied group, twice as many said their daily lives improved as deteriorated.  
Another key finding from the same survey is that employed women with children under 
the age of 12 were among the biggest winners: 71% said their daily life improved, while 
only 4.8% said it had worsened (Estrade and Méda).  In the end, the survey suggests that 
the 35-hour workweek improved the overall quality of life for the majority of French 
workers and can be considered a success. 
 Although the RTT et modes de vie survey that I and many academics have used is 
extremely useful because of its great detail in specific subject matters and sizable, 
relevant participants, there are limitations to the above conclusions, and they should be 
noted.17  Because the survey was conducted in 2000 and 2001, the opinions of employees 
who were affected by Aubry II and the ensuing amendments were not accounted for.  As 
I have discussed in previous chapters, after this time, the 35-hour workweek was watered 
down.  In reality, as flexibility increased, all workers’ weekly hours did not amount to 35, 
and this weakens a main source of possible benefits to employees.  In addition, the initial 
job creation requirement to receive state aid was removed after the implementation of 
Aubry II in 2002, so employees very well could have experienced greater work 
intensification as firms attempted to absorb the change by adding on to each employee’s 
workload.  Survey results from the employees affected by the amendments could produce 
different results—as they did with employment.   However, the results of the RTT et 
modes de vie survey are still advantageous in showing the initial effects of the original 
35-hour workweek, and what could have been without the amendments. 
                                                
17 The RTT et modes de vie survey was used by Anders Hayden, Marc Antoine Estrade, Valérie 
Ulrich, and Dominique Méda. 
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 Less-systematic, recent opinion polls provide additional information on the effects 
of the 35-hour workweek on quality of life.  A poll conducted for the small business 
employer confederation found that 59% of people in France believed that the 35-hour 
workweek was good for employees, a figure that rose to 70% for those who actually 
experienced the shorter workweek themselves (Ipsos).  A January 2005 poll found that 
77% wanted to keep their current hours, while only 18% wanted to work more (Ifop).  
Similarly, the strikes in 2005 by French workers in opposition to amending the 35-hour 
workweek that I discussed in Chapter 2 provide additional evidence of worker’s 
satisfaction.  Although the previous results of the RTT et modes de vie survey have 
limitations, these results provide a broadly similar picture of strong employee 
satisfaction.  In conclusion, the 35-hour workweek created unequal effects between 
workers of different skill-levels with higher-skilled workers gaining more, but greatly 
benefited women and promoted greater gender equality.  The policy may have affected 
workers in different ways, benefiting some more than others, but ultimately led to 
satisfaction and a greater quality of life for the majority of French workers.  
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CHAPTER 5: Additional Policies and Country Comparisons 
“The French welfare state generally succeeds in securing the majority of French people 
against the risks of modern life— losing one’s job, suffering financially from a serious 
illness or workplace accident, falling into poverty during old age, and so on.  This is no 
small feat.  Private insurance can never provide the sorts of financial guarantees that can 
come only from the state—Americans who pay large medical insurance co-payment fees 
can surely attest to this.” 
-Timothy Smith, author “France in Crisis” 
 
 In the past two chapters, I have discovered the economic and social effects of the 
35-hour workweek.  In the end, the policy neither substantially increased employment, 
nor increased the quality of life for all French workers.  Unemployment is still a major 
problem in France, and the current unemployment rate stands at 10.4%.18  In addition, the 
35-hour workweek foreshadowed the formation of inequalities in France, and this can be 
seen as a major problem in itself.  The French welfare state has many other labor policies 
that influence the life of workers, and specifically unemployment and worker well-being.  
The 35-hour workweek is only one policy in the midst of many.  It can neither fully fight 
unemployment nor increase quality of life on its own.  Other policies can play a large role 
in influencing these issues, so is important to consider their effects.  By looking at these 
additional French labor policies and comparing them to the policies of other countries, we 
can better understand overall working life in France, and determine if there are other 
solutions to fighting unemployment and promoting worker equality—two goals that the 
35-hour workweek simply did not accomplish. 
Additional French Labor Policies 
  There is no doubt that most employed persons in France live a superb life. 
Compared to their North American counterparts, the majority of the French enjoy three to 
                                                
18 In the 4th quarter of 2014, the unemployment rate was 10.4% (Labor Force Survey). 
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four times as many paid vacation days.  Public Institutions are well funded.  For example, 
there are excellent state-funded daycare facilities, and virtually free higher education is 
available to two million people (Smith 3).  The government has constructed he world’s 
third most expensive cradle-to-grave health care system, and in 2000 the World Health 
Organization ranked it the best in the world (World Health Report 2000).  Most 
pharmaceuticals are covered at 75 to 100%, and only the Japanese consume more of them 
than the French (Smith 4).  Public pensions are among the most generous in the world, 
and those who survive to the age of 58.5, which is the average age of retirement, can 
expect to live on large pensions financed by current workers’ payroll taxes and through 
the general tax system (Smith 4).  The French can even hop on a publicly subsidized high 
speed train and traverse the country in just four hours—in London this would take twice 
as long and cost twice as much (Smith 3).  In addition, the French have access to the 
world’s best system of museums, and the cities are beautiful and well preserved.  
 The broad view of life in France appears great, and many of the French should be 
proud of their system.  Those who work in France tend to have higher wages and better 
working conditions than in many other nations.19  In his book France in Crisis, Timothy 
Smith takes note of all that is great in France, but believes that the greatness comes, to a 
certain extent, at the expense of high unemployment and the withdrawal of several 
million people from the labor market, leaving inequalities in its midst (18).  The first 
trace of inequality can be seen through the beloved French public sector, and these 
workers tend to be the best protected.  Thirty percent of the population affiliated with the 
public sector consumes twice their share of the nation’s annual pension costs, while the 
                                                
19 During the mid-1990s, the minimum wage of France was over 60% of the median wage; in the 
United States it was only 39% and in Japan it was just over 30% (Smith 5). 
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remaining 70% of the retired population accounts for only 40% of pension costs (Smith 
23).  Civil servants benefit from a wide array of tax exemptions, salaries are typically 20-
30% higher, and they also receive special family allowances, free or subsidized housing, 
and free supplementary medical insurance (“Les salaires de la function publique”).  
Smith argues that since France’s unusually expensive public sector requires high taxes 
and deficits to sustain it, it bears down on the over taxed, over regulated private sector 
and contributes to the high unemployment rate (25).  In addition, the French public sector 
is the European leader in strike days, and they bargain for more favorable deals within the 
welfare state.  Because the public sector is so powerful and their strikes often bring entire 
cities to a halt, they often have the greatest voice in influencing political agendas, leaving 
other workers behind. 
 Another source of inequality can be found in long term unemployment, or those 
who are without a job for over 1 year.  In 1995, the French long term unemployment rate 
was 45%, six to nine times higher than that of Canadian and US rates (Gallie and 
Paugman 14).20  In North America, long-term unemployment has not exceeded 20% since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s (Smith 10).  Even in the midst of such high rates, the 
French economy has grown on average, 2% per year since 1980 (Cohen 126).  Senator 
Bernard Barbier argues, “if high unemployment persists in the context of an economy 
which is indeed growing, then the fruits of economic growth are not being shared, and 
something is preventing that newly created wealth from being translated into new jobs” 
(“Les Rapports du Sénat”).  Smith points out that new money was devoted to job creation 
during this time, but because most of the social spending went to pensions and health 
                                                
20 In 1995, the Canadian rate was 8%, and the U.S. rate was 5%. 
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care, they were overshadowed (11).  Even though the French government spends 
immense sums of money on certain welfare programs, unemployment remains high and 
therefore, these programs are not equally benefiting all of society. 
The Excluded 
 Some of the most excluded and unemployed in France include youth and 
immigrants.  Today, younger workers begin their careers ten years later than their parents 
did at a much lower real salary, and those who do work in their twenties are taxed at over 
twice the rate their parents were taxed at a similar age (Smith 190).  In 1996, only one in 
five of French youth aged twenty was working (Galland 81).  In 1992, 41% of 
unemployed French youth whose families hailed from the bottom quartile of the income 
ladder received no help from their parents, nor assistance from the state (Attias-Donfut 
666).  Today, many French students prolong their studies, obtaining degree after degree, 
going from internship to internship, with little hope of full-time employment at the end of 
their contract (Smith 190).  One potential cause of this could be the job protection 
afforded to older workers.  During the late 1990s, the average time spent at one particular 
full-time job in France was 11 years, compared to 8 years in the United Kingdom and 7 
years in the United States.  Smith argues that since jobs became so well protected in 
France, employers found it easier to squeeze more productivity out of existing workers 
than to hire additional ones (10).    
  Immigrants are in a similar situation.  The gap between the unemployment rate of 
immigrants and that of the general population is second highest in France (Bernard 148).  
It is drastic to assume that immigrants are unemployed because of racial discrimination, 
but opinion polls point to a racial crisis in France.  In 1990 a Eurobarometer poll revealed 
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that more than 60% of respondents regularly admitted to harboring racist thoughts, more 
people favored reducing the rights of immigrants than extending them, over 75% 
responded that there were “too many” Arabs in France, and 34% said there were too 
many people from the “Mediterranean” nations (Ferreol 55).  It should be noted that 
many of these immigrants in France have low skill levels.  For example, 83% of those 
who were at least fifteen years old when they arrived in France before 1975 were 
unskilled workers (Tribalat 160).  INSEE showed in its 2002-03 report on the state of 
France that there was still a strong link between immigrant background and 
underutilization of the education system (Smith 179).  This hints at the fact that many 
immigrant children might have a disadvantage in education and would also grow up to be 
unskilled workers. 
 The job market for unskilled labor in France is minute, suggesting another cause 
of high unemployment for immigrants.  Some authors have argued that France’s low-
wage service sector is so small because this type of job offends the morals of many 
Frenchmen, who still attach a certain degree of “honor” to work, and these jobs are not 
created in the first place (D’Iribarne).  Another reason for the small low-wage sector in 
France stems from the high wages and social benefits that come attached to all jobs, and 
many employers resort to increasing worker productivity and employing more labor-
saving technology (Smith 183-184).  Because the majority of jobs in France are so well 
funded and protected, there is little money available for the creation of new jobs.  In his 
1997 study of the low-skilled service industry in France, Thomas Piketty found that if 
France had the same percentage of workers in these sectors as in the United States, there 
would be three million more jobs in France (Piketty).  Often the burden of high 
  70 
unemployment rates in France has fallen on the shoulders of the youth and immigrants, 
and labor policies have neither been effective in increasing employment, nor reducing 
this inequality. 
France compared to the United States, Sweden, and Germany 
 It is obvious that France has an unemployment problem, and certain groups are 
unequally affected.  The French welfare state benefits the majority of its workers very 
well—better than many other nations— but the presence of such high unemployment and 
inequality suggest that there is room for improvement.  In order to fix these problems and 
improve, some policies must change and government resources must be spread more 
evenly to the entire French population.  By taking a brief look at labor policies in 
different countries, we can search for policies that have successfully fought 
unemployment and promoted equality and suggest solutions for France.  For this country 
comparison, I focus on the United States, Sweden, and Germany.  I use the United States 
as a drastic contrast, Sweden as the ideal welfare state, and Germany as a medium.  
 The French do not particularly like the United States.  As Amy Chua explains, 
“As with many people around the world, the French (not all of them, of course, but a 
significant minority) resent the USA’s economic success, its scientific prowess, its riches, 
its military power, and its sometimes arrogant and inconsistent projection of its powers 
and ideals around the world (11). The French are proud of their history, and as Smith 
suggests, “the French, heirs themselves to a great Revolution, believe that their model is 
also a potential gift to the world, and as a result, Anti-Americanism indulges France’s 
fantasy of past greatness and splendor” (66).  The French believe that they have 
constructed a more humane, less frenetic, and more generous labor market than the 
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United States.  Part of this is true.  The United States has a serious income inequality 
problem, non-existent or at best weak government support for low-wage families, a 
growing army of working poor, and poor public services (Smith 7).  But, in the United 
States, the public purpose is geared more towards economic growth. The American job 
market creates millions of positions in the economy for the unskilled, and the 
unemployment rate is much more stable.  France desperately needs a larger low-wage 
sector that can boost the employment of immigrants and decrease the total unemployment 
rate.  Anti-Americanism aside, the French could use a piece of the United States’ model. 
 I use Sweden as an ideal welfare state because France spends almost as much as 
Sweden on all things “social”, but France has twice the unemployment and three to four 
times the poverty (Smith ix).  The two countries have the same basic ideals, stressing 
common sacrifice and common benefits, but Sweden has been more successful in 
accomplishing these goals.  Taxes are high in both countries, but Sweden’s tax system is 
more progressive.  The Swedes must now work longer, into their mid-sixties, to receive a 
full pension (Smith 217).  The highly expensive, and at times selective pension system in 
France could follow the Swedish model, distributing tax revenue to more needed areas.  
The Swedish tax system also allows for greater income equality.  The wealthiest 10% of 
the French income ladder are 50% richer than their Swedish counterparts; the upper 
quarter of the French income ladder is not brought down by the tax system the way it is in 
Sweden (“Inequality”).  Wages are also more equal between age groups.  In a study of 
wage dispersion between younger and older workers in seven Western nations during the 
1980s, Peter Gottschalk and Mary Joyce found that the gap between the average salary of 
an older worker and a younger worker grew fastest in France, while Sweden stood out as 
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the one nation in which the young did not lose out to the old (Smith 196).  Sweden has 
been cutting and reorienting social spending towards the most needy, and promoting 
greater equality of workers, and I believe France should take note of this. 
 Germany has also had problems with high unemployment rates, but has reformed 
labor policies while creating more employment opportunities.  With 12% unemployment 
in 2003 and an ossified labor market, the German model, which is very much like the 
French, also collapsed inward on itself during the 1990s (Smith 15). To a greater extent 
than in France, however, German politicians have been willing to discuss the 
shortcomings of their model, to commission a report which was highly critical of labor-
market regulations, and to act, with positive results in 2003, creating up to one million 
new jobs (“Germany’s Labour-Market Reforms”).  In addition, Germany realized that 
pension spending had to be controlled, and reformed its pension system, making workers 
wait until they are at least 65 to receive a full pension. 
 During the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009, Germany also adopted a work-
sharing program to combat unemployment that is comparable to the 35-hour workweek.  
Under the program, called Kurzarbeit, employees working reduced hours received a 
“short-term allowance” of 60% of their former full-time wages, or 67% if they had a 
child (Felter 485).  In mid-2009, over 1.4 million workers and 63,000 employers 
participated in the program, creating the largest work-sharing program in the world.  The 
program cost the German government an estimated 5 billion euros, but saved more than 
200,000 jobs by the latter half of 2009 (Felter 485).  The policy was an extreme success 
compared to the United States, Sweden, and France; and the German unemployment rate 
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was least affected, increasing by only .2 percentage points between 2008-2009.21  The 
example of the German policy during the Great Recession provides current and relatable 
evidence of how labor policies, and specifically workweek reductions can successfully 
generate employment. 
 France’s many labor policies are successful in providing benefits and increasing 
the quality of life of the majority of workers, but the country also obtains rather high 
unemployment and growing inequality problems.  Many believed that the 35-hour 
workweek would fight unemployment and increase workers’ quality of life even more, 
but it fell short in the end as high unemployment returned, and only some workers’ 
quality of life greatly increased.  The additional labor policies in France have not 
contributed much to solving these two problems.  They increase the well-being of the 
majority, but at the expense of high unemployment and inequality.  The United States has 
its faults, and is in no way comparable to the great welfare state that France is, but the 
country actively creates jobs for the low-skilled, and France must expand this sector if it 
wants to increase employment opportunities for low skilled workers, and specifically 
immigrants.  Sweden has a highly progressive tax system that focuses on evenly 
distributing funds, reallocating them to those who are most in need.  By reforming the tax 
system, and channeling excess funds away from the old and public sector workers and 
into the pockets of the ones most in need, France can better deal with its growing 
inequality program.  In addition, by following Germany’s lead and enacting policies that 
actively seek to create employment opportunities, especially in times of need, France can 
                                                
21 Between 2008 and 2009 the unemployment rate increased by 3.5 percentage points in the 
United States, 1.7 percentage points in France, and 2.1 percentage points in Sweden.  Data 
retrieved from the OECD stat extracts. 
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be better equipped to deal with such high unemployment. The French welfare state is 
exceedingly generous, and even I would prefer to work in France than in most other 
nations, but labor policy in France is not perfect, and there is always room for 
improvement.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In my thesis I have explained that the extreme inequality during the Early Modern 
Era led to great resistance by workers in the form of strikes, and mobilization during the 
rise of labor unions.  By studying labor unions and demonstrations throughout history, I 
have provided evidence that depicts a hard-working and determined labor force in 
France, which fights not only for equality, but better overall working conditions.  
Although current participation rates show that modern unions are not as powerful as they 
once were, this data is misleading and French workers are still very much involved in 
voicing their opinions to higher officials, especially when they believe a particular issue 
is important.  This power is supported by the continuous presence of a high level of strike 
activity in France.  The historical legacy of inequality still plays a large role in 
influencing labor movements and suggests important aspects of the French work culture.  
When French workers feel as if they are being treated unfairly, they unite to protest and 
fight for their welfare, and they do so with passion.  The power of French workers awards 
them great opportunity to play an important role in influencing labor policy, and is most 
notably shown through action to protect their ultimate goal of maximum worker well-
being.  The 35-hour workweek in France is an example that clearly supports these two 
points.  
 Chapter 2 explained the rationale and specific implications of the 35-hour 
workweek.  In addition, I concluded that trade unions and many socialists were the most 
prominent supporters of the 35-hour week, while large corporations, employers unions, 
and right-winged officials were typically against it.  The many negotiations that followed 
the Aubry I law showcased the difference in opinions and set the stage for the numerous 
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ensuing amendments.  In the end, the amendments created great flexibility that firms 
could use to increase overtime and fluctuate work schedules during periods of high 
demand, and ultimately to avoid hiring.  The amendments watered down the original 
policy of the 35-hour workweek and foreshadowed the effects on employment and 
quality of life.  
 After analyzing the effects of the 35-hour workweek on employment and quality 
of life, I conclude that overall, the policy neither substantially decreased unemployment, 
nor added to the unemployment level.  The policy was most successful in its early years, 
before the amendments added flexibility and hindered the necessity to hire new 
employees. Quality of life, on the other hand, appeared to be positively affected by the 
35-hour workweek, benefiting a majority of workers.  Highly skilled workers, and 
particularly women, benefited the greatest, while lower-skilled workers experienced 
slight negative effects, as their workweek schedules fluctuated, and working conditions 
deteriorated.  Overall, the 35-hour workweek was successful in increasing the quality of 
life for the majority of the French labor force.  This positive conclusion provides the 
greatest evidence that relates back to the culture of work in France: the French work to 
live.  The French workers fought for the 35-hour workweek because they believed that it 
would increase their well-being both at and away from work, and for the most part, they 
were right.  The 35-hour workweek has proved to be beneficial in increasing worker 
welfare, and because employment rates were not necessarily affected, the policy was not 
a major hindrance to the French economy. 
 The 35-hour workweek is only a small part of the greater labor policy in France.  
The failures of the policy in increasing employment and equality only hint at the larger 
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issues in France.  Labor policy has been designed to greatly benefit many, and working 
life in France can be considered superior to many other nations, but often, a large 
minority of the French is excluded from these same benefits.  Youth and immigrants 
make up the majority of the unemployed in France, and they are not granted the same 
protection from the state as others.  Labor policy is geared towards increasing the well-
being of workers, but it creates the same problems that the 35-hour workweek 
unsuccessfully combatted—unemployment and inequality.  If these problems are to be 
solved, benefits must be shared more equally, and reform will be necessary.   
 Although the overall results of the 35-hour workweek were generally 
advantageous for the French labor force, this policy could still be improved as well.  The 
many amendments that were promoted by employers and right wing politicians 
transformed the policy and took away many of the most significant aspects.  The 
amendments greatly inhibited the potential for immense success.  French workers have 
done their part during demonstrations to protect their beloved 35-hour workweek—and I 
believe it is here to stay—but in order for the policy to reach its greatest potential, the 
French will have to uncover some of their revolutionary tradition that has historically 
molded the culture of work in France, and use this power and determination to 
thoroughly mold the 35-hour workweek into a policy that most greatly benefits the 
population equally.  In return, they will strengthen one of the main aspects that define the 
culture of France, and foreigners marvel at.  By working to live, the French labor force 
can truly appreciate and experience all of the greatest aspects of life that many foreign 
workers—and unfortunately, some French citizens themselves—miss out on.  
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